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The seventeenth-century English Revolution was pulsing with new democratic 
ideas of civil rights, marital freedom, freedom of speech and press, religious liberty, 
separation of church-state, and disestablishment of religion.  The English philosopher 
and poet, John Milton was among the most radical and articulate advocate of these 
ideas, which he set out in hundreds of pages of brilliant and trenchant prose.  This 
Article offers a full account of Milton’s reformist agenda and uncovers some of the 
genesis and genius of his ideas in earlier Christian and classical traditions.  It also 
documents the enduring significance of Milton’s ideas for later Anglo-American writers 
like John Locke, and later common law and constitutional reforms on both sides of the 
Atlantic.  
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God is decreeing to begin some new and great period in his 
Church, even to the reforming of [the] Reformation itself, [in 
order] to make a knowing people, a Nation of Prophets, of 
Sages, and of Worthies.           -- John Milton (1644)1 
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For by natural birth, all men are equally alike born to like 
property, liberty, and freedom, and as we are delivered of God 
by the hand of nature into this world, everyone with a natural, 
innate freedom and property (as it were writ in the table of 
every man’s heart, never to be obliterated) even so we are to 
live, everyone equally and alike to enjoy his birthright and 
privilege; even all where God by nature hath made him free.... 
Every man by nature being a King, Priest, and Prophet in his 
own natural circuit and compass, whereof no second may 
partake, but by deputation, commission, and free consent 
from him whose right and freedom it is.” 
       --Richard Overton (1646)2 
 
“We now under Christ [are] a royal priesthood, 1 Pet. 2:9, as 
we are co-heirs, kings and priests with him.” 




Over the past three decades, a veritable cottage industry of important new 
scholarship has emerged dedicated to the history of rights talk in the Western tradition 
prior to the Enlightenment.4  We now know a great deal more about classical Roman 
understandings of rights (iura), liberties (libertates), capacities (facultates), powers 
(potestates), and related concepts, and their elaboration by medieval and early modern 
civilians.5  We can now pore over an intricate latticework of arguments about individual 
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and group rights and liberties developed by medieval Catholic canonists and moralists, 
and the ample expansion of this medieval handiwork by neo-scholastic writers in early 
modern Spain and Portugal.6  We now know a good deal more about classical 
republican theories of liberty developed in Greece and Rome, and their transformative 
influence on early modern common lawyers and political revolutionaries on both sides of 
the Atlantic.7  We now know, in brief, that the West knew ample “liberty before 
liberalism,”8 and had many fundamental rights in place before there were modern 
democratic revolutions fought in their name. 
In this Article, I focus on the development of rights talk in the pre-Enlightenment 
Protestant tradition.  More particularly, I show how early modern Calvinists -- those 
Protestants inspired by the teachings of Genevan reformer John Calvin (1509-1564) -- 
developed a theory of fundamental rights as part and product of a broader constitutional 
theory of resistance and military revolt against tyranny.  With unlimited space, I would 
document how various Calvinist groups from 1550 to 1700 helped to define and defend 
each and every one of the rights that would later appear in the American Bill of Rights, 
and how these Calvinists condoned armed revolution to vindicate these fundamental 
rights when they were chronically and pervasively breached by a tyrant.   
As an illustration of this broader story, this Article focuses on the reformation of 
rights and liberties led by the great English poet and philosopher, John Milton (1604-
1674).  Writing in the throes of the English Revolution (1640-1660), Milton formulated a 
revolutionary account of law, religion, and human rights, grounded in a Calvinist theory 
of human nature and human society.  Following Calvinist conventions, Milton believed 
that each person is created in the image of God with a perennial craving to love God, 
neighbor, and self.  Each person has the law of God written on his and her heart, mind, 
and conscience, and rewritten in Scripture, most notably in the Decalogue.  Each 
person is a fallen and fallible creature in perpetual need of divine grace and forgiveness 
which is given freely to all who ask for it.  Each person is a communal animal, naturally 
inclined to form private, domestic, ecclesiastical, and political associations.  Each such 
association is created by a consensual covenant or contract that defines its form and 
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function and the rights and powers of its members, subject to the limits of natural law.  
Each association is headed by an authority who rules for the sake of his or her subjects 
and who must be resisted if he or she becomes abusive or tyrannical.  All such 
resistance must be as moderate, orderly, and peaceable as possible, but it may rise to 
revolt and regicide if necessary in the political sphere.9   
More original, and more controversial in its day, was Milton’s theory of the “real 
and substantial” rights and liberties that must prevail in a commonwealth sincerely 
devoted to a “true and holy reformation.”  Milton developed his theory of rights and 
liberties in three overlapping phases – almost in a rolling process of logical discovery 
and rhetorical calculus.  His first major concern was religious liberty, which he 
articulated in five rhetorically violent tracts against the clergy of 1641 and 1642.  His 
initial concern was to protect the individual’s liberty of conscience and freedom of 
worship from what he called the greedy idols of legally-established Anglicanism and the 
spiritual tyranny of idle ceremonies, corrosive customs, and erroneous beliefs.  He 
returned to these religious liberty themes in several of his later writings, culminating in A 
Treatise on Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes (1659).  Each time, he called more 
loudly for freedom of conscience and exercise, open toleration for all peaceable biblical 
religions, separation of church and state, and disestablishment of religion – principles of 
religious liberty that would become hallmarks of later American constitutionalism.10 
Milton’s second concern was domestic or private liberty, which he defended in 
his four marriage tracts of 1644 and 1645.  His initial focus was to press for the 
unilateral right of a man to divorce his wife without proof of a traditional fault or 
impediment and thus regain the right to remarry someone more suitable.  He returned to 
this theme a few more times, too, and eventually widened his argument into a more 
general call for domestic liberty or privacy – the right of a fit man and fit woman to 
marry, separate, and divorce in accordance with the simple rules of Scripture and 
nature alone, the right of parents and teachers to nurture and educate their children in 
their own beliefs and values, the right of householders to be free from illegal searches 
and seizures by censors and police, all of which he considered to be essential rights of 
private domestic association.  These principles, too, would become hallmarks of the 
later Anglo-American constitutional tradition.11   
When church and state authorities of the day rebuked him for his radical views, 
Milton folded his arguments for religious and domestic liberty into a more general theory 
of civil and political liberty.  He sketched some of this argument already in his famous 
paean to free speech, entitled Areopagitica (1644).  He expanded and refined the 
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argument in his equally famous First and Second Defence of the People of England in 
1650 and 1654.  Now he advocated not just freedom of religious conscience, but 
freedom of the mind and of opinion altogether; not just freedom of religious worship, but 
freedom of all speech and public expression; not just freedom to petition God in prayer 
but freedom to petition authorities in public; not just freedom to enter and exit marriages 
without interference, but freedom to participate and rule in all associations, including 
those of church and state. By the time he was finished, Milton had sketched a good bit 
of the theory supporting the freedoms of religion, speech, and association that would 
become central to later English and American constitutionalism, and eventually to the 
modern international human rights movement as well.12 
Milton premised his logic of liberty on a fervent belief in truth, with a capital T -- 
The Truth of God and Scripture, the Truth of reason and nature, all to be discovered by 
free and robust education and inquiry, experiment and debate.  Only when freed from 
the tyranny of prelates and monarchs, of tradition and custom, of ignorance and error, of 
censors and licensors, he believed, could divine, natural, and human Truth finally be 
discovered and developed.  Milton also premised his logic of freedom on a fervent faith 
in the inherent goodness and potential of every English man and woman.  Once freed 
from the tyrannies of church and state and of mind and heart, once steeped in the 
virtues of Scripture and nature and of learning and literature, every English subject 
would seize the Truth with alacrity and soar to splendid new heights of understanding 
and accomplishment.  What England needed to accomplish all this was a second 
Reformation that built on but went beyond the successes of the sixteenth-century 
Protestant Reformation.  This was to be an outer reformation that purged the core 
institutions of family, church, and state from all remaining sources and species of 
tyranny and brought true domestic, spiritual, and civil liberty.  It was also to be an inner 
reformation that purified the heart, mind, and conscience of the tyranny of tried and tired 
traditions and unleashed a lively spirit of inquiry and learning, a true love of virtue and 
goodness, a native talent for self-rule and self-direction.13 
Part I of this Article provides a brief sketch of the main events and texts of the 
English Revolution and Milton’s emerging role therein.  Parts II-IV take up his respective 
contributions to the reformation of religious, domestic, and civil rights and liberties in 
early modern England.  The Conclusion reflects on the enduring significance of some of 
Milton’s teachings for the evolving Anglo-American constitutional tradition.  
This Article is dedicated to the memory of my great mentor, friend, and colleague 
Professor Harold J. Berman.  Twenty-five years ago, when I was a fledgling law student, 
Hal Berman took me under his wing and patiently began teaching me to fly.  For the 
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past twenty-two years, we have worked together as colleagues at Emory Law School 
and in the Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University, sharing a deep 
common interest in the weightier matters of the law.  I was especially grateful for the 
privilege of working with him on his monumental Law and Revolution series, some of 
whose themes are echoed herein.  Whatever I have become as a scholar and a teacher 
owes much to Hal Berman’s noble instruction and example. I dedicate this Article to his 
memory -- with unbounded admiration, appreciation, and affection.  The world is much 
emptier now without my Chief. 
I. John Milton and the English Revolution 
 
The Causes and Course of Revolution.14  In 1640, the English “world turned 
upside down.”15  For the first time in eleven years, King Charles called Parliament into 
session, and the members erupted in unprecedented fury against two decades of 
belligerent royal policies that had left the nation in disarray.  Some of Parliament’s fury 
was directed at Charles’ religious policies.  Upon his succession to the throne in 1625, 
Charles had stepped up his father’s already stern Anglican establishment laws and 
began persecuting Calvinists (often called Puritans) and other religious dissenters with 
a vengeance, driving them by the boatload to the Netherlands and to America – some 
20,000 in 1632 alone.  In 1633, he appointed William Laud as Archbishop of 
Canterbury, who began purging English pulpits of Calvinist sympathizers and packing 
them with conservative clerics, loyal to the Crown and to the textbooks of established 
Anglicanism – the Book of Common Prayer, the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Faith, and the 
Authorized or King James Version of the Bible.  Charles and Laud strengthened 
considerably the power and prerogatives of the Anglican bishops and the ecclesiastical 
courts.  They also tried to impose Anglican bishops and establishment laws on 
Scotland, triggering an expensive and ultimately futile war with the Scottish 
Presbyterians.  English dissenters who criticized these religious policies were pilloried, 
whipped, and imprisoned, and a few had their ears cut off and were tortured.  When the 
Parliament was finally called in 1640, it let loose a massive torrent of protests, including 
the famous Root and Branch Petition and The Grand Remonstrance that called for the 
abolition of much that was considered sound and sacred in the Church of England.16   
 
 
14 This section on the events of the English Revolution is largely derived from volume 2 of Berman’s 
masterpiece on law and revolution, and the numerous sources cited therein.  See HAROLD J. BERMAN, 
LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE 
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (2006).  
15 Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution (1988).  
The phrase is from Acts 17:6. 
16 See representative documents on both sides in CPW 1:954-998; 1 Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Struggle 




Some of Parliament’s fury was directed at the Crown’s repressive political and 
economic policies.  Continuing in his father James I’s footsteps, Charles regarded the 
Parliament not so much as a representative of the people as a functionary of the Crown, 
to be called or suspended at the Crown’s discretion.  After 1629, he suspended the 
Parliament in retaliation for its uncooperativeness, and began imposing fiscal and 
economic policies that traditionally called for Parliamentary involvement, if not consent.  
These policies were implemented by a series of new royal officers, notably the widely 
hated Earl Thomas Strafford.  Needing money for his unpopular wars and lavish living, 
Charles levied crushing taxes on the people without their consent.  He feigned a 
national military emergency that strengthened his royal prerogative and allowed him to 
institute military tribunals to mete out rough justice against rebels and to fabricate a form 
of national taxation on all people.  He fined the gentry for their failure to become knights 
and for their purported trespasses on the royal forests.  He quadrupled inheritance 
taxes and receipts from wardships.  He sold commercial monopolies to the highest 
bidders, creating oligarchies that inflicted massive abuses on workers and high prices 
on consumers.  He confiscated private properties and compelled farmers and small 
businessmen to make loans that were never repaid.   He forced tradesmen and 
craftsmen into guilds that were subject to strict controls, heavy bureaucracies, and 
sundry fees.  And to make all these onerous restrictions work, Charles enhanced the 
power of the royal prerogative courts and administrators -- Star Chamber, Admiralty, 
High Commission, Requests, Privy Council and more – that enforced royal policies 
ruthlessly, and stripped away many of the procedural protections and conventions 
maintained by lawyers in the Inns of Court.  Charles’ royal officers also interfered deeply 
in city and rural county governments that had governed local affairs for centuries without 
much royal involvement.  An already weakened economy was made worse by a series 
of poor harvests and the collapse of the lucrative cloth trade, and by spiraling inflation.17 
When Parliament was finally called into session in 1640, an unlikely assemblage 
of aristocrats, lawyers, artisans, financiers, and religious dissenters united in seizing 
power with a vengeance.  Whipped up by Calvinist preachers who thundered fire-and-
brimstone sermons denouncing the tyranny of the English church and state, Parliament 
worked hard to dismantle Charles’ policies.18  In a series of acts from 1640-1642, 
Parliament abolished Star Chamber, the Court of High Commission, and other royal 
prerogative courts, and shifted much civil and criminal jurisdiction to the common law 
courts.  Parliament limited ship money, forced loans, and other hated taxes and claimed 
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exclusive jurisdiction over all future taxation.  It removed many of the new 
encumbrances on the aristocracy and gentry, restored the traditional uses of the royal 
forests, and removed some of the monopolies and guilds.  It truncated severely the 
temporal power of the Anglican bishops and removed the clergy from the House of 
Lords.  It tried both Strafford and Laud for their belligerence, sending Strafford to the 
gallows and Laud to the Tower.  And it passed a law that required the King to call 
Parliament thereafter at least triennially and ideally every year.19   
When, in response, Charles sought to abolish the Parliament and to arrest some 
of its leaders for treason, civil war broke out.  Royal and Parliamentary forces locked in 
battle from 1642-1646 and again in 1648.  Most Calvinist forces lined up in support of 
Parliament.  Many Anglicans remained loyal to Charles.  Charles did not help his cause, 
however, when it was discovered that he sought secretly to enlist the aid of the Scots, 
promising them special patronage and protection for Presbyterianism in exchange for 
their military support.   Charles also did not help his cause when he proved powerless to 
put down the Irish Rebellion of 1641, a bloody uprising of Irish Catholics against 
Protestant settlers in Ireland.20  Charles’ own fecklessness in dealing with these Irish 
Catholics, his marriage to a Catholic, and his attempts to ally with Catholic French and 
Spanish forces compounded the many rumors already circulating that he was moving to 
restore a Catholic establishment in England.  This enraged the Parliamentary forces 
even more, and provided no end of fodder for Protestant propagandists.  They 
ultimately defeated the royal armies, and took Charles prisoner in 1647.  
While the Long Parliament, as it came to be called, continued to meet regularly 
throughout the 1640s, it was stymied by the increased radicality of some of its 
members, and the sectarian divisions among Separatist, Independent, and Leveller 
parties.  Only in 1649, with the more radical elements finally and forcibly purged, did the 
Rump Parliament, as the purged body was now called, return to more concerted 
leadership of the nation.  That year, the Rump Parliament passed an Act declaring and 
constituting the People of England to be a commonwealth and free state.  It abolished 
the kingship and the aristocratic House of Lords and declared that supreme authority 
resided in the people and their representatives.  It formally and finally disestablished 
Anglicanism and its episcopal ecclesiastical structures, and confiscated large portions of 
the Anglican Church’s property.  And most momentous of all, a Parliamentary 
committee tried the deposed King Charles in a sensational trial, convicted him for 
treason, and executed him by public beheading.  England was now to be a 
Commonwealth, free from hereditary monarchy, free from an aristocratic House of 
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Lords, free from an established Anglican Church, and subject to the democratic rule of 
Parliament.21   
This democratic experiment was short-lived.  From 1649 to 1653, much political 
power shifted to a 41-member aristocratic Council of State, which served alongside the 
Rump Parliament.  This new government did pass several laws that liberalized marriage 
and divorce laws and that opened large tracts of property held by the Church and the 
Crown.  But it also passed severe laws repressing adultery, blasphemy, Quakers, and 
unlicensed evangelical preaching, and it imposed a number of unpopular taxes on the 
people. In 1653, Oliver Cromwell, fresh from military victories over the rebellious Irish 
Catholics and the Scottish Presbyterians who had recognized Charles II as their King, 
abolished the Rump Parliament and called for new elections.  The new Barbones 
Parliament, as it came to be called, created a new Protectorate government under 
Cromwell’s leadership.  This Protectorate government proved even more repressive 
than the last, and Cromwell’s stern moral, military and economic policies were singularly 
ineffective.  After Cromwell died in 1658, his son Richard took over, but he proved too 
weak to sustain the Commonwealth government, and it collapsed.22 
In 1660, King Charles II, son of Charles I, returned to England and restored the 
traditional monarchical government and the traditional Anglican establishment.  This 
Restoration era, too, was short-lived.  When his successor, King James II, the other son 
of Charles I, began to abuse his royal prerogatives as his father had done and to betray 
his growing Catholic sympathies, Parliament forced him to abdicate the throne in 1688 
in favor of the new dynasty of William and Mary.  This was the Glorious Revolution.  It 
established government by the King in Parliament and brought forth the Bill of Rights 
and the Toleration Act of 1689, two critical constitutional documents that included a 
number of the rights guarantees initially proposed by the revolutionaries in the 1640s 
and 1650s.23  
The Literature of Revolution.  The English Revolution of 1640-1660 triggered 
an avalanche of popular writing by Calvinists.  More than 22,000 pamphlets, sermons, 
and tracts all told were published in these twenty years, denouncing the tyranny of the 
prior regime, justifying the removal and eventual execution of the monarch, and calling 
for more robust protections of the people’s rights and liberties.24  Following the example 
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of earlier Calvinist revolutionaries on the Continent, English Calvinists pointed first to 
their historically chartered rights and liberties that had been tyrannically abridged.  For 
them, the Ur text was the Magna Carta of 1215 that had been issued by the Crown at 
the behest of the church and barons of England. The Magna Carta guaranteed that “the 
church of England shall be free and shall have all her whole rights and liberties 
inviolable.”  It also guaranteed that all “free-men” were to enjoy their “liberties” – notably 
various discrete rights to property, marriage, and inheritance, to freedom from undue 
military service, to jury trial in criminal cases, and to freedom to pay their debts and 
taxes from property of their own choosing.25  Some seventeenth-century pamphlets 
sought simply to broaden these ancient chartered rights and liberties so that they 
applied to all peaceable churches, not just the Church of England, and to all English 
citizens and subjects, not just the narrow class of aristocratic free-men.26 This argument 
was not utopian.  Sir Edward Coke, the greatest legal mind of England until his death in 
1634, had brilliantly documented four centuries of cases and statutes that had slowly 
expanded some of the guarantees of the Magna Carta since 1215.  His 1628 Institutes 
of the Lawes of England, which put these precedents together, became an anchor text 
of the pamphleteers in the 1640s and 1650s.27   
Also important to these pamphleteers was the Petition of Right of 1628, which 
Coke, too, had largely drafted.  This document set forth “the diverse rights and liberties” 
of Englishmen in and beyond the Magna Carta.  Parliament had pressed this document 
on a very reluctant King Charles in exchange for their consent to new taxes to support 
his unpopular wars.  The Petition sought to prevent any further royal abuses of power.  
It called for no taxation without “the good will” and “common consent” of the Parliament; 
no forced loans from the people; no taking of a man’s life or liberty “but by the lawful 
judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land”; no taking of a man’s land, no 
imprisonment, and no disinheritance without “due process of law”; no suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus; no forced quartering of soldiers or mariners in private homes; no 
criminal prosecution or punishment save for actions that were expressly outlawed by 
Parliamentary legislation; and no further use of martial law save in true emergencies.  
All these “rights and liberties,” the Petition declared, were to be maintained and 
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enforced “according to the laws and statutes of this realm,” without “prejudice” to the 
people or to their Parliament.28 
But despite this further enumeration, the royal government for the next eleven 
years trampled on the people’s rights and liberties and suspended Parliament.  The 
challenge that the pamphleteers faced in the 1640s and 1650s became this: how to 
restore the people’s rights and to reform their government on the strength of more than 
dusty old charters and precedents that the king could cavalierly disregard.  Their 
answer: England must establish a strong new democratic constitution dedicated to rule 
of law and respect for rights.   
Some of the most articulate proposals came from the pens of a trio of powerful 
Puritan pamphleteers – John Lilburne, Richard Overton, and William Walwyn.29  Each of 
these figures wrote a large number of pamphlets on his own and bore the scars of the 
whips, pillories, and harsh imprisonment he endured for his writings and speeches.30  
The three of them collaborated, along with Thomas Prince, on An Agreement of the 
Free People of England (1649), a proposed new constitution for England.  In the 
preamble, the authors lamented the “long and tedious prosecution of a most unnatural 
cruel, homebred war,” occasioned by “the exercise of unlimited or arbitrary power.” 
They also lamented the “multitudes of grievances and intolerable oppressions” inflicted 
on the people.  Invoking the Gospel teaching, “Blessed are the peacemakers” (Matthew 
5:9), they called on their countrymen “to make a right use of that opportunity God hath 
given us to make this nation free and happy, to reconcile our differences, and beget a 
perfect amity and friendship once more amongst us, that we may stand clear in our 
consciences before Almighty God [as] the free people of England.”31 
The 1649 Agreement focused carefully on the forms and functions of 
government.  The heart of the government, they insisted, should be a representative 
Parliament, with annual election of members, and no member serving consecutive 
annual terms.  All persons were eligible to run for office, save Catholics and foreigners. 
Interference in elections by anyone was a serious crime.  Parliament was to stick to its 
clearly enumerated powers, including importantly the power over foreign policy and 
diplomacy and the power to impose taxes at an “equal rate” “upon every real and 
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personal estate.”  Parliament could not interfere with the judiciary or executive at the 
national or local levels, all of which were answerable to the people.  Nor could 
Parliament interfere in military matters, beyond appointment of generals and raising 
military revenues when needed; other military matters were to be left to local 
governments in the areas where the troops were raised.32  Though the 1649 Agreement 
was silent on the subject, this trio of authors had earlier called for a comprehensive 
revision and codification of English law, and the crafting of new statutes published in 
plain English and made easily accessible to the people.33  They had also urged that 
both the House of Lords and the monarchy be expunged. Other pamphlets offered 
much more detailed plans for democratic government after the Rump Parliament 
formally abolished the House of Lords and executed the monarch in 1649.34 
The 1649 Agreement further called for “the preservation of those safeguards, and 
securities of our lives, limbs, liberties, properties, and estates” already set out in the 
1628 Petition of Right.  To these guarantees, the Agreement added several others.  It 
added a strong religious freedom clause that prohibited “any laws, oaths, or covenants, 
whereby to compel by penalties or otherwise any person to anything in or about matters 
of faith, religion or God’s worship or to restrain any person from the profession of his 
faith, or to exercise of religion according to his conscience.”  Also included was a 
guarantee of freedom from compulsory tithes and appointed clergy and freedom for 
members of each parish to elect and contract with their own ministers.35  In earlier 
pamphlets, the authors had also called for freedom from compulsory oath-swearing and 
military service for the conscientiously opposed, freedom from “a single form of church 
government” enforced by excommunication, and a guarantee that no one could “be 
punished or persecuted as heretical” “for preaching or publishing his opinion in religion 
in a peaceable way.”36 Also in earlier documents, this same trio had called for a more 
general freedom of “speaking, writing, printing, and publishing” and freedom of the 
people for “contriving, promoting, or presenting any petitions” to Parliament concerning 
their “grievances or liberties.”37  
In addition to freedom of religion (and speech), the Agreement elaborated 
several criminal procedural guarantees: no prosecution or punishment for crimes in 
cases “where no law hath been before provided”; a guarantee of the privilege against 
self-incrimination; the right to call witnesses in criminal defense; the right to jury trial; no 
capital punishment “except for murder” or other “like heinous offences” notably treason; 
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punishments in non-capital cases that were “equal to the offence”; and no imprisonment 
for delinquency in paying private debts.  In earlier pamphlets, the three authors had also 
called for “just, speedy, plain, and unburdensome” resolution of “controversies and suits 
in law,” at least two witnesses “of honest conversation” for capital conviction, and no 
detention or imprisonment without a warrant.38  
Finally, the Agreement protected commerce, business, and private property.  It 
included guarantees of tax-free and excise-free domestic and foreign trade as well as 
freedom from government-sponsored business monopolies, a subject of frequent 
complaint in earlier pamphlets.  It forbad any government actions designed to “level 
men’s estates, destroy property, or make all things common,” and required officials to 
make provision for the poor and restore to the families the private estates of criminals, 
save those who had been executed for treason.  This was a truncated version of the 
authors’ wider calls for a comprehensive system of public schools, hospitals, common 
recreational places, and well-funded poor relief programs.39  
This was a quite typical list of the rights and liberties that were being pressed by 
the Calvinist and other pamphleteers in the mid-seventeenth century.  They pressed 
these claims not merely as positive rights created by the state, but as natural rights 
created by God and to be confirmed by a state constitution.  Every person by his or her 
very nature, the pamphleteers insisted, has equal and natural rights to life, liberty and 
property.  Every person is equally called by God to be a “prophet, priest, and king” with 
a natural right and duty to speak, preach, and rule in the community.  Richard Overton 
put it typically in 1646: “For by natural birth, all men are equally alike born to like 
property, liberty, and freedom, and as we are delivered of God by the hand of nature 
into this world, everyone with a natural, innate freedom and property (as it were writ in 
the table of every man’s heart, never to be obliterated) even so we are to live, everyone 
equally and alike to enjoy his birthright and privilege; even all where God by nature hath 
made him free.... [E]very man by nature [is also] a King, Priest, and Prophet in his own 
natural circuit and compass, whereof no second [person] may partake, but by 
deputation, commission, and free consent from him whose right and freedom it is.”40   
The signature phrase -- that every person is a “prophet, priest, and king” with 
natural rights and duties to speak, preach, and rule in the community -- became an 
organizing idiom of a distinctly Calvinist theory of rights and liberties in mid-
seventeenth-century England.  It served both to integrate many of the rights and 
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liberties inherited from the common law tradition and to cultivate new rights and liberties 
that the English Calvinists considered essential to democratic constitutionalism.  
The English pamphleteers did not invent this phrase.  It was made famous a 
century before by the German reformer Martin Luther in his 1520 manifesto, Freedom of 
a Christian.41  This tract, Luther’s best seller, was a frontal assault on medieval 
hierarchical views of society, particularly the Catholic Church’s claim that the clergy 
were by nature and calling superior to the laity.  Luther thought this claim unbiblical.  
Building on 1 Peter 2:9, Revelations 5:10, 20:6 and other biblical texts, Luther argued 
for the priesthood, prophethood, and kingship of all believers – that everyone in 
Christendom must be a priest and servant to his peers, that everyone must preach and 
prophesy God’s truth and justice to his neighbor, that everyone must do his part to help 
rule and govern the affairs of this earthly kingdom.  This was a revolutionary idea in 
sixteenth-century Europe.  It challenged not only the traditional authority of the clergy 
over laity, but eventually all traditional authority structures -- rulers over subjects, 
husband over wives, parents over children, masters over servants, and more.   
While Luther’s idea broke the power of clerical hegemony in the Protestant world, 
it soon became a recipe for anarchy and antinomianism, as each new Protestant 
convert now claimed to be a law unto himself, free from the rule of church, state, and 
family.  Chastened especially by the rioting of the 1525 Peasants’ Revolt, Luther and his 
followers buffered the radical implications of this idea by emphasizing the natural 
authority of the heads of family, church, and state over their subjects, and the need for 
all persons to exercise their natural rights and gifts strictly within the limits of their own 
unique Christian vocations and with an eye to the common good.42 The Genevan 
Calvinist reformers took over this more limited teaching of prophet, priest, and king.43 
Thus, when in 1562, the Genevan man of letters Jean Morély used the idea of prophet, 
priest, and king to call for a more democratic form of local church government free from 
the heavy hand of the Genevan Consistory, he was excommunicated and banished for 
his “pernicious,” “slanderous,” “scandalous,” “schismatic,” and “seditious” views.  His 
books were publicly censored and burned, and those who printed or used them were 
viewed as accessories to heresy.44  
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What had been Calvinist theological heresy in the sixteenth century, however, 
became Calvinist political orthodoxy in the seventeenth.  As English Calvinists chafed 
under increasingly onerous restrictions on their ability to publish, preach, and participate 
in Parliament and political life, they began to seize anew on this signature Protestant 
phrase of “prophet, priest, and king” to ground their opposition.  These royal restrictions, 
they argued, were compromising their rights to discharge faithfully the duties of 
prophethood, priesthood, and kingship to which God called all Christians. A few radical 
Calvinist groups, like the Diggers and Ranters, pressed these arguments to anti-
establishment extremes.45  But most English Calvinists used the teaching that each 
person is prophet, priest, and king to press for the natural and constitutional rights of 
free speech, religious exercise, and democratic participation in the churches and 
commonwealth of England.   
John Milton and the Revolution.  John Milton was the most articulate and 
inventive advocate for this emerging Calvinist political theory.  To be sure, Milton was 
sometimes more individualistic and idiosyncratic in his views than a number of his fellow 
reformers.46  Moreover, he eschewed the fierce denominational loyalty that was 
expected of a Calvinist in England – flitting easily in and out of warring Independent, 
Presbyterian, Separatist, Leveller, and other Calvinist camps, and consorting readily 
with Arminians, Baptists, and other sectarian groups in search of new ideas.  But Milton 
was a fair and forceful summarizer and synthesizer of some of the best inherited 
Calvinist teachings on rights, revolution, and regicide, and he cast these teachings into 
enduring English forms, especially in his defense of Parliament’s execution of Charles.  
He repeatedly called England to embrace the Calvinist reformation, and to extend its 
theological teachings into the political and legal sphere.  He grounded his own novel 
arguments about law, religion, and human rights, as a good Calvinist should, first and 
foremost in the Bible, whose sundry teachings on point were, in his view, underused by 
his fellow reformers.47  And he anchored his theory of liberty in the teaching that each 
and every Christian in the commonwealth is at once a prophet, priest, and king with 
inherent rights that attach to these three offices. This teaching provided him with a 
sturdy theological anthropology to support the freedoms of speech, religion, and 
association that he championed especially.  It also inclined him toward more radical 
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democratic reforms of church, state, and family – though he later retreated toward more 
aristocratic views of government and more patronizing views of the individual.48 
Milton did not, of course, work alone or represent the views of every English 
Calvinist, let alone every Englishman.  The honor roll of prophets of liberty in 
seventeenth-century England is long -- William Ball, John Bastwick, Richard Baxter, 
John Bunyan, Henry Burton, Oliver Cromwell, Thomas Edwards, John Goodwin, 
Thomas Goodwin, Robert Greville, Henry Ireton, John Milton, John Owen, Henry 
Parker, Isaac Pennington, William Prynne, John Pym, Henry Robinson, Samuel 
Rutherford, John Saltmarsh, Roger Williams, Henry Vane, Henry Vane the Younger, 
John Wildman, Gerrard Winstanley, among many others.  Milton did not help his 
reputation among some of these figures by serving as Secretary for Foreign Languages 
in Oliver Cromwell’s increasingly repressive regime, or by escaping persecution even 
from the Restoration government of 1660.  Lacking these badges of courage, many 
suspected him of duplicity and political trimming.  Even Milton’s brilliant poems, 
Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained, remained for a time under the shadow of James 
Harrington’s utopian Oceana (1656), a more stridently democratic tract that earned 
Harrington a long stay in prison and eventual exile for treason.49  But, longer term, 
Milton could not be matched in the power of his rhetoric or the prescience of his 
teachings.  He anticipated and articulated a number of important Calvinist theories of 
law, religion, and human rights that would become axiomatic for the later common law, 
and indeed for the Western legal tradition altogether.  
Milton was at first reluctant to enter the fray of the English Revolution.50  His 
father, an Anglican convert from Catholicism, had sent him to Cambridge University to 
study for the Anglican priesthood.  After absorbing the sentiments of his Puritan 
teachers and observing the practices of the established Anglican clergy, however, 
Milton concluded that “tyranny had invaded the church,” and he “thought it better to 
preserve a blameless silence before the sacred office.”51 He resolved instead, upon 
earning his master’s degree in 1632, to remain a layman and to pursue the quiet life of a 
scholar and poet.  It proved impossible for him to stay out of the political discussion for 
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long.  Especially when the Long Parliament began its heated deliberations in 1640, the 
country was dividing sharply between royal apologists and revolutionary agitators.  In 
early 1641, Milton stepped into the fray, firmly on the side of revolution.  He described 
his motivations as follows:  
As long as liberty of speech was no longer subject to control, 
all mouths began to be opened against the bishops; some 
complained of the vices of the individuals, others of those of 
the order.  They said it was unjust that they alone should differ 
from the model of the other reformed churches; that the 
government of the church should be according to the pattern 
of other churches, and particularly of the word of God.  This 
awakened all my attention and my zeal.  I saw that a way was 
opening for establishment of real liberty; that the foundation 
was laying for the deliverance of man from the yoke of slavery 
and superstition; that the principles of religion, which were the 
first objects of our care, would exert a salutary influence on 
the manners and constitution of the republic; and as I had from 
my youth studied the distinction between religious and civil 
rights, I perceived that if I ever wished to be of use, I ought at 
least not to be wanting to my country, to the church, and to so 
many of my fellow-Christians, in a crisis of so much danger.52 
In the course of the next twenty years, Milton published some forty major tracts.  
The most important for our purposes were five tracts against the Anglican 
establishment,53 four more calling for the reformation of marriage,54 a brief tract on 
education,55 a comprehensive book of Christian doctrine,56 five tracts on church, state, 
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and tyranny,57 a famous manifesto on freedom of speech,58 and two more famous 
defenses of the rights and liberties of the English people.59  All these tracts were 
published between 1641 and 1660.  Thereafter, Milton published revised editions of 
several of them, as well as some brushed-up versions of his student papers.  But he 
devoted most of his last years to completing his two poetic masterpieces, Paradise Lost 
and Paradise Regained.60  While both these poems echoed his favorite legal and 
political themes, Milton now cloaked his more strident views in allegory to escape the 
new Restoration censors.    
Many of Milton’s writings were chock-full of familiar Calvinist teachings, and 
studded with generous references to Calvin and the Genevan Reformation and to 
Theodore Beza, Martin Bucer, George Buchanan, François Hotman, Peter Martyr, 
William Perkins, Pierre Viret, and other Calvinists.61  Milton lauded the insights and 
sacrifices of the early English reformer, John Wycliffe, and the Marian exiles, 
Christopher Goodman, John Knox, and John Ponet -- all “fathers in the faith we hold.”62  
He also found inspiring the resistance theology and revolutionary politics of fellow 
reformers in France, Scotland, and the Netherlands, to which he adverted frequently.  
Milton crisply summarized Calvinist commonplaces about rights, resistance, and 
revolution in a famous passage in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1649), the first 
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[A]ll men naturally were born free, being in the image of and 
resemblance of God himself, and were by privilege above all 
the creatures, born to command and not to obey; and that they 
lived so.  Till from the root of Adam’s transgression, falling 
among themselves to do wrong and violence, and foreseeing 
that such courses must needs tend to the destruction of them 
all, they agreed by common league to bind each other from 
mutual injury, and jointly to defend themselves against any 
that gave disturbance or opposition to such agreement. 
Hence came cities, towns, and commonwealths.  And 
because no faith in all was found sufficiently binding, they saw 
it needful to ordain some authority, that might restrain by force 
and punishment what was violated against peace and 
common right. This authority and power of self-defense and 
preservation being originally and naturally in every one of 
them, and unitedly in them all, for ease, for order, and lest 
each man should be his own partial judge, they 
communicated and derived either to one, whom for the 
eminence of his wisdom and integrity they chose above the 
rest, or to more than one who they thought of equal 
deserving....  
The power of kings and magistrates is nothing else, but what 
is only derivative, transferred and committed to them in trust 
from the people, to the common good of them all, in whom the 
power yet remains fundamentally, and cannot be taken from 
them, without a violation of their natural birthright.... As the 
king or magistrate holds his authority of the people, both 
originally and naturally for their good in the first place, and not 
his own, then may the people as often  as they shall it for the 
best, either to choose him or reject him, refrain or depose 
though no tyrant, merely by the liberty and right of free born 
men, to be governed as seems to them best.63   
These familiar themes were being widely espoused in Milton’s own day by fellow 
English and Scottish reformers.  Milton added further biblical proof texts, historical 
examples, and colorful rhetorical embroidery to these arguments.  Particularly his two 
long and caustic Defences of the English People in their regicide of Charles, both tracts 
directed against the famous Dutch apologist for monarchy named Salmasius, became a 
 
 




classic formulation and made Milton famous on the Continent.  But Milton’s main 
arguments were all Calvinist commonplaces. 
More original, and more controversial to his fellow Calvinists, was Milton’s theory 
of religious liberty, domestic liberty, and civil liberty that must prevail in a truly reformed 
commonwealth. On these issues, Milton sometimes pressed Calvinist premises to 
startling, even scandalous, conclusions that few Calvinists in the day could countenance 
and no Parliament would codify.  Indeed, some of his proposed reforms did not find 
theological or legal acceptance until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
II. Religious Rights and Liberties 
The Laws and Liberties of Conscience.  Milton regarded religious liberty as a 
God-given and God-directed natural right.  By being created in God’s image, Milton 
argued, each person has something of the “image of the mind of God” within him, a 
conscience or right reason that gives him access to divine truth and direction and a will 
and capacity to act on that knowledge.64  Each person has the law of God written into 
his or her conscience, heart, and mind.  By this law, each person knows the duties 
owed to God, neighbor, and self.  He knows what is right and wrong, good and bad, 
holy and evil.  He knows the cardinal virtues of justice and charity, wisdom and 
prudence, sincerity and industry.  He knows the differences between pride and humility, 
greed and generosity, envy and love, anger and kindness, lust and continence, gluttony 
and temperance, sloth and zeal, and other vices and virtues.65 
Each person, however, has been created with a natural freedom to choose how 
to act on the knowledge taught by this natural law of conscience.  God did not make 
persons as blind automatons who loved him out of reflex or servile subjects who obeyed 
him out of fear.  Rather than constrain each person under “a perpetual childhood of 
prescription,” Milton wrote, God “trusts him with the gift of reason to be his own 
chooser.”66  Animals and plants are created simply to obey the laws of nature around 
them.  Persons are created with the freedom to accept or reject the natural laws of 
conscience or adopt a wide range of conduct in between. That is what it means to be 
created as an image-bearer of God, with a natural reason and will that reflect something 
of the reason and will of their Creator.  
Many there be that complain of divine Providence for suffering 
Adam to transgress, foolish tongues!  When God gave him 
reason, he gave him freedom to choose, for reason is but 
choosing; he had been else a mere artificial Adam, such an 
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Adam as he is in the motions.  We ourselves esteem not of 
that obedience, or love, or gift, which is of force: God therefore 
left him free, set before him a provoking object, ever almost in 
his eyes, herein consist his merit, herein the right of his 
reward, the praise of his abstinence.67  
 
 None of this changed with Adam’s fall into sin.  The natural law of conscience 
remains inscribed on the conscience of each person, and the natural freedom to act in 
response to these commandments likewise remains in place.  “A kind of gleam or 
glimmering” of the natural law remains even in the most evil of men, Milton wrote, and it 
provides them with some light to shine even in their darkest darkness.68  But, because 
of human sinfulness, this natural light and law of conscience by itself is too dim and 
diffuse to provide much direction for the earnest pursuit of truth and goodness. To find 
their way to true virtue, to true love of God, neighbor, and self, persons need the fuller 
spiritual light of God’s Word.  To exercise their natural freedom meaningfully, they need 
supernatural direction.  “If there were no God,” Milton wrote in rebuke of purely 
rationalist theories of natural law, “there would be no real dividing line between right and 
wrong.  What was to be called virtue, and what vice, would depend upon mere arbitrary 
opinion.  No one would try to be virtuous, no one would refrain from sin because he was 
ashamed or feared the law, if the voice of conscience or right reason did not speak from 
time to time in the heart of every man, reminding him ... that a God does exist, and that 
everyone must render to him an account of his actions, good and bad alike.”69  
As both the Bible and other ancient sources make clear, God reminded persons 
of the natural law of conscience in different ways over time and across cultures.  In the 
time of Noah and his progeny, God largely left persons to live by the natural law of 
conscience alone – though he occasionally sent angels and oracles, plagues and 
miracles to drive home his most important commandments.  Some ancients, notably the 
great biblical patriarchs, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, showed that they 
understood this natural law and could act on it responsibly, especially when God or an 
angel paid them a visit.  But left to their own devices and desires, even these great 
patriarchs often lived in open violation of the natural law, much to the consternation of 
God.70  
In the time of Moses, therefore, God elected to give his chosen people of Israel a 
much fuller reminder and revelation of His law.  On Mt. Sinai, He gave the Jews detailed 
ceremonial, juridical, and moral laws to govern their relations with God, neighbor, and 
self, to guide their every step on the way to virtue.  By the ceremonial law, He taught 
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them how to dress and eat, what rituals and sacrifices to make, how to build their 
temples and altars.  By the juridical law, He taught them the basic rules of how to 
organize their domestic, political, and spiritual lives.  And by the moral law, He taught 
them a series of “thou shalts” and “thou shalt nots” to guide them in their duties of love 
to God, neighbor, and self.  God entered into a covenant of works with the Jews, 
promising them eternal blessings if they obeyed this law, eternal curses if they 
disobeyed.  When the people disobeyed, God in his mercy sent them prophets to 
remind them of the law, to drive them to repentance, and to assure them of forgiveness 
if they returned to the law.  When they disobeyed again, he sent them for a time into 
exile in Babylon.  But he later returned a faithful remnant to the promised land and 
restored to them the ancient law of Moses and renewed the covenant of works.71  
The Mosaic law, while detailed, was only a partial and temporary revelation of 
God’s law, however, Milton argued. The Mosaic law was binding on the Jews alone, and 
not on other nations.  It was tailored to the time and place of the ancient Israelites -- first 
in their exodus, then in their promised land.  It was calibrated to break the hardness of 
heart and habits of sin that the people had repeatedly betrayed when they lived under 
the law of nature alone.  The Mosaic law served, in the words of St. Paul, as a 
temporary “schoolmaster until Christ came,” a form of elementary instruction and 
discipline, with detailed rules, procedures, and ceremonies designed to teach the Jews 
step-by-step how to love God, neighbor, and self, and thus prepare themselves and all 
people for the coming of Christ.72  As Milton put it in his Christian Doctrine: 
The Mosaic law was a written code, consisting of many 
stipulations, and intended for the Israelites alone.  It held a 
promise of life for the obedient and curse for the disobedient.  
Its aim was to make the Israelites have recourse to the 
righteousness of the promised Christ, through a recognition of 
mankind’s and therefore of their own depravity.  Its aim, also, 
was that all we other nations should afterwards be educated 
from this elementary, childish, and servile discipline to the 
adult stature of a new creature, and to a manly freedom under 
the Gospel, worthy of God’s sons.73  
Now that the “manly freedom”74 of the Gospel of Christ has come, Milton argued, 
the Mosaic law has been rendered obsolete.  Christ fulfilled the Mosaic law in all its 
particulars, so that no one would be forced to try to fulfill it again.  He absorbed the 
punishment that the Mosaic covenant of works threatened for the disobedient, so that 
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no one would have to suffer its condemnation any longer.  And he offered salvation 
freely to all who have faith, so that no one would be forced to the humility and futility of a 
salvation by works. The Gospel of Christ teaches the same fundamental lessons of 
virtue taught by the law of Moses and by the law of nature – that we must love God, 
neighbor, and self in all that we do.  But the Gospel, and the further exposition of its 
teachings in the Epistles, instructs us in a very different way than the Mosaic law. The 
Gospel guides by general principle; it does not govern by specific precept.  It sets forth 
examples and illustrations of how to live by the spirit of the law; it does not set down 
rules and procedures of how to observe its every letter.  It offers the perfect example of 
Christ to be imitated, but leaves Christ’s followers with freedom to follow that example in 
various peaceable ways under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.75   
Christ’s teaching is “much more excellent and perfect than the law” of Moses, 
Milton argued.76  It is a “pulsing, breathing law,” “written in the hearts of believers 
through the Holy Spirit,” not a stiff, formal law, written on “tablets of stone” by the “finger 
of God.”77  It is a universal norm intended for all persons, not just a local rule directed to 
the instruction of a single people.  It is an eternal norm that “will last until the end of the 
world,” not just a temporary law assigned in the time of our schooling.78  It is a law of 
freedom, not a law of bondage, a covenant of grace, not a covenant of works.  The 
teaching of Christ provides everyone with a better way to understand more clearly the 
meaning of virtue and love originally taught by the natural law of conscience.  It dispels 
the shadow of sin that obscures proper understanding of this natural law.  It restores in 
all who accept Christ the free exercise of their natural freedom that was lost in the fall 
into sin.79   
Milton returned again and again to this theme of the freedom that is available to 
all who have faith in Christ.  “Christian liberty means that Christ our liberator frees us 
from the slavery of sin and thus from the rule of the law and of men, as if we were 
emancipated slaves.  He does this so that, being made sons instead of servants, and 
grown men instead of boys, we may serve God in charity through the guidance of the 
spirit of truth.”80  To be sure, said Milton, there is a place for detailed rules for actual 
youngsters who are being educated to understand the “manly freedom” of Christ to be 
enjoyed when they become adults.  Like the ancient Jews, these budding Christians 
need rules to prepare them for their mature life in Christ.  But the goal of this rule-bound 
schooling is not to enslave them in sin or shackle them to a life of works righteousness.  
It is rather “to repair the ruins of our first parents [Adam and Eve] by regaining to know 
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God aright, and out of that knowledge to love him, to imitate him, to be like him, as we 
may the nearest by possessing our souls of true virtue, which being united to the 
heavenly grace of faith makes up the highest perfection.”81 
Milton piled up sundry New Testament verses to support his thesis about 
Christian freedom. “For freedom, Christ has set us free.”82 “You were called to 
freedom.”83  “Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom.”84  “For the law of the 
Spirit of life in Christ has set [you] free from the law of sin and death.”85  “You will know 
the truth, and the truth will make you free.”86  “You will be free indeed.”87  You all have 
been given “the law of freedom” in Christ, "the glorious liberty of the children of God."88  
You must all now “live as free men.”89    
For Milton, the upshot of all these biblical passages was that “the whole Mosaic 
law is abolished by the Gospel, [for] its purpose is attained in that love of God and of our 
neighbor which is born of faith and through the spirit.”90 The Gospel abolishes not only 
the ceremonial and juridical laws of Moses.  After all, these laws prescribe routine 
actions that any disciplined person can follow if he tries.  The Gospel also abolishes the 
moral laws of Moses, particularly as set forth in the Decalogue.  These moral laws are 
much harder to follow, for they prescribe a way of life that runs directly contrary to our 
sinful nature.  It is the moral law of Moses, not the ceremonial or juridical law, that 
“disturbs believers and makes them waver.”91  It is the moral law that even the most 
disciplined and devout soul cannot fulfill in every particular.  It is the moral law that 
“enslaves,” “curses,” and “shames” everyone, traps them in their sinfulness, and drives 
them to despair.92  If there is any part of the Mosaic law that Christ fulfills on our behalf, 
Milton thus concluded, it is the moral law.  Why would Christ lift only the lighter yoke of 
the ceremonial and juridical laws that some of us can carry, but leave the heavier yoke 
of the moral law that will eventually crush all of us in our depravity. That is a false, a 
nonsensical redemption, said Milton. “It must have been the entire Mosaic law from 
which Christ redeemed us.”93 
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This was a more radical understanding of Christian freedom from law than was 
traditional among Calvinists.  All Calvinists agreed that the ceremonial laws of Moses 
dealing with sacrifice, diet, ritual, dress, and the like were entirely abolished by Christ.  
Most further agreed that the juridical laws of Moses dealing with domestic, political, and 
religious life were also not per se binding -- although perhaps they could still be useful 
guides for modern life and law.  But every Calvinist insisted that the moral law of Moses 
remains valid and valuable for Christians.94  Particularly the Decalogue, Calvinists 
taught, is the best summary of the natural law of conscience and the clearest source of 
principles of how to love God, neighbor, and self.  As such, the moral law has important 
“uses” in setting a minimal morality of duty for all persons and a higher morality of 
aspiration for true believers.95  Christ thus preserved the moral law and exemplified its 
spirit.  Christ freed Christians from its curses so that they could be free to try to live by 
its commandments without fear of condemnation if they inevitably stumbled. The 
Westminster Confession (1647), drawn up by an assembly of leading Calvinist divines 
from Scotland and England, put these familiar Calvinist teachings in authoritative form in 
Milton’s day:  
The moral law does forever bind all, as well justified persons 
as others, to the obedience thereof; and that, not only in 
regard of the matter contained in it, but also in respect of the 
authority of God the Creator, who gave it. Neither does Christ, 
in the Gospel, any way dissolve, but much strengthen this 
obligation.  
Although true believers be not under the law, as a covenant 
of works, to be thereby justified, or condemned; yet is it of 
great use to them, as well as to others; in that, as a rule of life 
informing them of the will of God, and their duty, it directs and 
binds them to walk accordingly; discovering also the sinful 
pollutions of their nature, hearts and lives; so as, examining 
themselves thereby, they may come to further conviction of, 
humiliation for, and hatred against sin, together with a clearer 
sight of the need they have of Christ, and the perfection of His 
obedience. It is likewise of use to the regenerate, to restrain 
their corruptions, in that it forbids sin: and the threatenings of 
it serve to show what even their sins deserve; and what 
afflictions, in this life, they may expect for them, although freed 
from the curse thereof threatened in the law. The promises of 
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it, in like manner, show them God's approbation of obedience, 
and what blessings they may expect upon the performance 
thereof.96  
Milton rejected this familiar Calvinist teaching of the uses of moral law.  He called 
it the false teaching of “converted Pharisees” who “believe that the law should still be 
observed even in Gospel times.”97  No person needs the law to be forced to grace or to 
confess his sin, Milton argued.  God’s grace is irresistible, and his forgiveness is 
complete; law has no value in this new economy of salvation.  It makes no sense to say 
that Christians are freed from the curse of the law but still must live under its strictures.  
For law by its nature, and especially the moral law, condemns the disobedient and their 
children.  Remember God’s words in the Decalogue: “For I, the Lord your God am a 
jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth 
generation of those who hate me.”98 And the moral law is not a voluntary regimen: 
“Moses imposed the literal or external law even on those who were unwilling to receive 
it; whereas Christ writes the internal law of God on the hearts of believers through his 
Spirit, and leads them as willing followers.”99 
Such sentiments led many critics to regard Milton as a radical antinomian.  The 
Westminster Divines likely had Milton and like-minded libertines in mind when they 
warned solemnly that the spiritual liberty of the Gospel does not give Christians a 
license for sin or an exemption from authority.100  In their 1647 Confession, the Divines 
agreed wholeheartedly that “God alone is the Lord of conscience, and hath left it free 
from the doctrines and commandments of men, which are, if anything, contrary to his 
word.”101  But, then they went on to warn:  
They who, upon pretence of Christian liberty, do practice any 
sin, or cherish any lust, do thereby destroy the end of Christian 
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liberty, which is, that being delivered out of the hands of our 
enemies, we might serve the Lord without fear, in holiness and 
righteousness before Him, all the days of our life. 
And because the powers which God has ordained, and the 
liberty which Christ has purchased are not intended by God to 
destroy, but mutually to uphold and preserve one another, 
they who, upon pretence of Christian liberty, shall oppose any 
lawful power, or the lawful exercise of it, whether it be civil or 
ecclesiastical, resist the ordinance of God.102 
Milton was no antinomian, however, despite his rantings against the “external” 
moral law.  Indeed, he ranted just as loudly against the licentious and the libertines who 
sought to live by no law at all on the pretext of Christian liberty.103  For Milton, Christian 
liberty is not a freedom to do as one pleases.  It is liberty to do one’s duties of love to 
God, neighbor, and self – the original natural duties written into human conscience, now 
amplified and elaborated by the spiritual duties set out in Scripture.  The first and 
foremost right and duty of every free Christian, therefore, Milton wrote, is “to read and 
interpret the Scriptures; and by that I mean interpret them for himself” in order to discern 
“the mind of Christ.”104  For “the Scripture only can be the final judge or rule in matters 
of religion, and that only in the conscience of every Christian to himself.”105  This right 
and duty to study Scripture is not reserved to the wise and learned, to preachers and 
theologians who keep the Bible encased in impossible foreign languages and claim a 
monopoly on what it means.  No, it is just as important that “the simple, the poor, the 
babes [of] every age and sex” have access to the Scripture in their own language and 
study it on their own terms.106  For God is “requiring from them the ability of searching, 
trying, examining all things, and by the Spirit discerning that which is good.”107  
The second right and duty of the free Christian is, in fact, to do that which is good 
-- to lead a virtuous life, as those virtues are expounded in Scripture, exemplified by 
Christ, and explicated by the Holy Spirit.  The precise ethics of virtue are for each 
person to discern and develop on their own, Milton insisted.  But the broad outlines of 
Christian virtue are clear enough to anyone who reads the Scripture or the classic texts 
of the tradition.108  These Christian virtues are set out most clearly in the Decalogue and 
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in other moral norms and habits taught by Scripture.  Without pausing a moment to say 
how all this squared with his loud call for the abolition of the moral law, or with his 
insistence that each person read and interpret Scripture for himself, Milton poured out 
nearly 200 pages of good works and virtuous ethics that a free Christian could and 
should freely adopt.  He worked his way first through the two tables of the Decalogue -- 
setting out in detail, and with a whole tangle of accompanying biblical texts, “the virtues 
which are related to ... God,” “the duties towards his neighbors and the virtues 
connected with this,” and “virtues connected with a man’s duty toward himself.”109  He 
then worked his way, one by one, through the Ten Commandments to show the 
principles and practices of virtue that could be found therein and in related passages. 
His exegesis was sometimes strained, occasionally scandalous.  For example, Milton 
saw no justification for a Sabbath day of worship or rest among Christians, for this was 
to him an obsolete ritual of the Old Testament Jews that was cancelled by Christ’s law 
of love.110  But he saw no justification for monogamous marriage alone, since polygamy 
and concubinage were customary in the Old Testament and there was no text directly 
on point in the Bible to condemn them.111 In these and other passages, Milton revealed 
no consistent biblical hermeneutic, and he constantly violated his own first (and frankly 
silly) rule of interpretation that “each passage of Scripture has only a single sense.”112  
But that said, it must also be said that a good bit of his exegesis of the Decalogue and 
exposition of virtuous Christian living squared easily with the Westminster Catechisms 
and other conventional English Calvinist handbooks of morality and dogma.113  
The third right and duty of the free Christian is to imitate Christ in discharging the 
three-fold office of prophet, priest, and king.114  Christ is a prophet, Milton wrote, in that 
he was appointed by his father to “educate his church in heavenly truth and to teach the 
whole will of his father.”115 Christ is a priest in that “he offered himself to God the father 
as a sacrifice for sinners, and has always made intercession for us.”116  Christ is a king 
in that he “rules and preserves, principally by internal law and spiritual power, the 
church which he has bought for himself.”117  Christians, who are followers and imitators 
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of Christ and who live with the mind of Christ, have the right and duty to discharge these 
same three offices.  Christians, too, as prophets, must educate the church and the 
whole world about heavenly truth, and the whole will and Word of God.  They, too, as 
priests, must sacrifice for others, pray for them, and care for them as loving neighbors.  
They, too, as kings, must rule themselves by the same internal law and so share in the 
ruling and preservation of Christ’s church.  “God is decreeing to begin some new and 
great period in his church,” wrote Milton.  “We now under Christ [are] a royal priesthood, 
as we are co-heirs, kings and priests with him.”118  
Ultimately, Milton came closer to traditional Calvinist formulations of the laws and 
liberties of conscience than his occasional antinomian rantings might suggest.  Like 
Calvinists, he believed in the radicality of human sin and the need for redemption in 
Christ.  He believed in the division between Law and Gospel, between the life of the 
flesh and the life of the spirit.  He believed in stock doctrines like justification by faith 
alone, the supreme authority of the Bible, the Christian vocation of all believers, the 
perennial call to imitate Christ, and the absolute sovereignty of God over all things 
including the human conscience.  While he rejected the moral law as an external law of 
slavery, he embraced it as an internal law of virtue, which left him with a distinction 
without much difference.  While he rejected the doctrine of the civil, theological, and 
pedagogical uses of the moral law, he in fact used the moral law in civil, theological, and 
pedagogical terms to work out his system of virtue ethics for Christians.  While he 
dismissed the Old Testament as a record of slavery from which Christians were free, he 
in fact parsed every verse of the Old Testament for lessons and examples of virtuous 
Christian living.  On many fundamental questions of the laws and liberties of 
conscience, Milton differed from the Calvinist tradition more in form than in substance.   
Church and State.  One question over which Milton had real substantive 
differences with Calvinists of his day, and even more with Anglicans, concerned the role 
of church and state, separately and together, in governing religious life. Just because he 
had such a robust view of individual religious liberty and private biblical judgment, he 
looked askance on many traditional forms of religious life and religious establishment 
that were imposed on individual Christians.  Just because he embraced the doctrine of 
the prophethood, priesthood, and kingship of all Christians, he viewed with skepticism 
any laws that abridged the Christian’s right and duty to speak, to worship, and to rule 
within the church.  As he translated these arguments about individual religious liberty 
and Christian office-bearing into strong reforms of church and state, it became clear that 
these arguments applied to other areas of life beyond church-state relations and to 
other types of rights besides religious rights.  What began as a difference in accent with 
conventional Calvinists, eventually became a real difference of ideas about the 
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reformation of society, politics, and rights altogether, as we shall in the next two 
sections.  But his arguments started with the church – first the established Anglican 
Church and eventually the established Presbyterian Church as well.  
Milton’s attack on the established Church of England came in five early 
rhetorically violent tracts of 1641 and 1642, whose main themes he elaborated in more 
sober and general terms in several later writings.  Milton first took aim at the legally-
established Anglican doctrines, liturgies, and morals of his day.  Many of these were, in 
his view, old Catholic traditions that had been absorbed into the half-papalist Anglican 
Church created by Henry VIII a century before.  Rather than live by the simple truth of 
Scripture and the primitive Christianity of Christ and his apostles, Milton argued, the 
Anglican Church has fabricated a massive network of idle and idolatrous doctrines, false 
and foolish customs, erroneous and embellished traditions all designed to entangle and 
strangle the free Christian conscience.  Rather than lead Christians in a humble and 
quiet life of charity, prayer, and Scriptural meditation, the church has adopted all 
manner of elaborate liturgies, masses, cults, and ceremonies that stink with the 
“vomited paganism of sensual idolatry.”119  Rather than let individual Christians search 
the Scripture for themselves under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the church has 
bound and tied them to calendars and liturgies, rituals and lectionaries, Sabbath days 
and holy days that smother every breath of private Christian inspiration, imagination, 
and innovation.  Those teachings of Christianity that should be indifferent are made 
essential.  Those that should be left discretionary are made dogmatic.  All this error and 
idolatry masquerading as Christianity, Milton charged, has caused a mighty wrenching 
and spraining of the text of Scripture and a massive strangling and choking of its 
teachings of Christian liberty.120   
Milton took even sharper aim at the Anglican clergy who, following their medieval 
Catholic brethren, lord it over the laity in worldly luxury and moral laxness.  “To do the 
work of the Gospel, Christ our Lord took upon him the form of a servant,” Milton wrote 
with intended irony.  “[H]ow can his servant in this ministry take upon him the form of a 
lord?”121  But lords the Anglican clergy have certainly become – and not just those high 
clergy who serve in the House of Lords.  In every house of worship, Anglican clergy 
have become landed aristocrats, with vast properties, powers, and prerogatives at their 
call.  Milton railed in disgust at the Anglican clergy of his day.  They are “a tyrannical 
crew,” a “corporation of imposters,” “halting and time-serving” prelates, “Egyptian 
taskmasters of ceremonies,” “a heap of hard and loathsome uncleanness,” a “whip of 
scorpions,” “illiterate and blind guides,” “a wasteful band of robbers,” “a perpetual havoc 
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and rapine,” “a continual hydra of mischief and molestation,” “importunate wolves,” “wild 
boars,” “locusts and scorpions,” “downtrodden vassals of perdition,” and on and on.122   
Milton singled out for special criticism the various clerical privileges and habits 
that so galled English Calvinists and other dissenters of his day – the Anglican clergy’s 
exemptions from taxation and immunities from prosecution, the high compulsory tithes 
and religious taxes that supported their extravagant sanctuaries, sinecures, and 
cemeteries, their lush clerical gowns, surplices and tippets, their ornate icons, artwork, 
and altars, all neatly railed off from any touch or use by the laity.  He attacked the 
English church courts, those hated and powerful tribunals that controlled the intimate 
and interior lives of the laity with their “dreadful works of holy discipline, censure, 
penance, excommunication, and absolution,” to say nothing of their rapacious fees and 
fines.123  These clerical “leeches” “suck and suck the kingdom” of its life blood.124  “What 
a mass of money is drawn from the veins into the ulcers of the kingdom this way; their 
extortions, their open corruptions, the multitude of hungry and ravenous harpies.”125  
What a “loud stench of avarice, simony, and sacrilege”126 belches out of these 
“unctuous and epicurean paunches”127 purporting to be Christ’s humble servants in his 
church, even while living as lavish lords and preying as greedy thieves.  All such clerical 
exploitation violates not only our religious liberty “but all the right[s] we have to our own 
bodies, goods, and liberties” guaranteed since the Magna Carta (1215).128  
What makes all this clerical exploitation even worse, Milton continued, is that the 
clergy are appointed to office without the consent or control of their congregants.  The 
early church was a democratic institution, Milton argued at length, citing very selectively 
from the ancient sources.  Early Christians regarded clergy and laity alike as priests 
before God, each with different Christian offices and vocations to fulfill in the broader 
community. Following biblical precedents, they elected them to the offices of priests, 
deacons, presbyters, or bishops.  And these elected clergy were all held accountable to 
the laity and voted out when they failed in office or became abusive.  Indeed, “the voice 
of the people in episcopal elections” and church governance “was so well known” by the 
third century that even the pagan Roman emperor “desired to have his governors of 
provinces chosen in the same manner.”129   
 
 
122 All these foregoing quotes are distilled on CPW 1:113.  
123 CPW 1:591. 
124 CPW 1:589. 
125 CPW 1:591. 
126 CPW 1:610. 
127 CPW 1:611. 
128 CPW 1:593.  See further CPW 1:537, 545, 547-548, 554-558, 568-569, 576-577, 589-593, 603, 606,  
610-614, 617; CPW 3:239-241. 




All this changed dramatically in the fourth through sixth centuries, however, when 
Emperor Constantine and his imperial successors Romanized the church, even as they 
Christianized the Empire.  Particularly damaging was that the emperors elevated the 
bishops into prelatical monarchs made in their own imperial image.  Even more 
damaging was that the emperors claimed it as their imperial prerogative to appoint and 
remove these clerical prelates, ending three centuries of clerical elections by and 
accountability to the people in the pews.  “Monarchy and prelatry” were thus brought 
together into a “most unholy union” whose inevitable progeny would be spiritual 
tyranny.130  Soon enough, state-appointed bishops no longer served their flocks in love 
with “brotherly equality, matchless temperance, frequent fasting, incessant prayer and 
preaching, continual watchings and labors in [their] ministry.”131 Instead, they “forsook 
their first love, and set themselves up two gods instead, mammon and their belly, then 
taking advantage of the spiritual power which they had on men’s consciences, they 
began to cast a longing eye to get the body also, and bodily things into their 
command.”132   
We still maintain this absolute “church tyranny” in the Anglican Church today, 
Milton charged, even though the state itself has since been partly democratized through 
Parliamentary elections.133  Why can’t church members at least elect local clergy in the 
same way that political citizens elect local members to the House of Commons?  
“Should not the piety and conscience of Englishmen as members of the church be 
trusted in the election of pastors to functions that nothing concern a monarch” – 
especially since they are already trusted to the election of Parliamentarians whose 
functions so very much concern the monarch?134  Since we “already have a kind of 
apostolic and ancient church election in our state,” should not at least that much local 
election also prevail in the “state church”?135  
And, why indeed, should there be a “state church” and “statute-religion” at all, 
Milton demanded -- now widening his attack to include the emerging Presbyterian 
establishment in England.136  Why should Christianity of any sort be established by 
human laws?  Why should its clergy be ruled by secular magistrates?  After all, Christ’s 
most famous political admonition was to “render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, 
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and to God the things that are God’s.”137 The early church lived faithfully by this Gospel 
teaching for three centuries, and thrived and grew despite the bitter persecution of 
Caesar and his minions.  It was the same fourth-century Caesar, Emperor Constantine, 
who upon conversion to Christianity first defied this basic political teaching of Christ, 
Milton charged.  It was Constantine who first took “the things that are God’s” and made 
them “the things that are Caesar’s.”138  It was Constantine who prescribed the church’s 
doctrines and liturgies and punished its heretics and enemies.  It was Constantine who 
convened the church’s councils and synods and controlled its polity and property.  It 
was Constantine who appointed the church’s bishops and clerics and collected its tithes 
and taxes.  What Constantine and his successors first established in ancient Rome, the 
church has maintained for more than a millennium, with only a few brave Church 
Fathers and early Reformers dissenting.  To this day, most Protestants and Catholics 
alike lie “enthralled” and “seduced” by Constantine’s “lavish superstition” -- that the 
establishment of Christianity by law and that the rule of church by the state are essential 
to the survival of each.139   
But Christianity does not need laws to survive, nor does the church need the 
state to thrive.  The very opposite is true, Milton insisted.  Separation and division -- not 
“conflation and confusion” – of church and state, and of law and faith, are the proper 
way of Christ.140   We “should not suffer the two powers, the ecclesiastical and the civil, 
which are so totally distinct, to commit whoredom together, and, by their intermingled 
and false riches, to strengthen indeed in appearance, but in reality to undermine, and at 
last to subvert one another.”141  Milton returned to this theme again and again, calling it 
“absurd” that Christians have “not learned to distinguish rightly between civil power and 
ecclesiastical.”142  The Bible makes clear that “Christ’s kingdom is not of this world,” and 
his church “does not stand by force or constraint, the constituents of worldly 
authority.”143  Nor is Christ’s church like some “vine” that “cannot subsist without 
clasping about the elm of worldly strength,” or some building that cannot support itself 
“without the props and buttresses of secular authority.”144 The contrary is true, Milton 
argued.  “[I]t is because the magistracy and church have confuse[d] their jurisdictions” 
that “all Christendom” has reaped a “bitter harvest” of crusades and wars, inquisitions 
and pogroms, bloodshed and persecution.145  It is because church and state have 
conflated their powers and offices that the church has become “a pontifical despotism 
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decked, under pretense of religion, with the spoils of civil power, which it has seized 
unto itself contrary to Christ’s own precept.”146   
Christ’s own precept is that that the main foundation of the church and “the 
complete text” of the Christian faith is the Bible.147  It is blasphemy for anyone to add to 
or subtract from the Bible by human laws and traditions in their governance of the 
church and the Christian faith.  Christ’s further precept is that the ruler of this church is 
not some mighty magistrate or pompous prelate.  The ruler of the church is each and 
every humble individual Christian who meditates on and lives by the simple truth of the 
Bible.  Every Christian is called by Christ to be not only his prophet and his priest, but 
also his king, his ruler, within the church.  Every Christian has the “Word of God before 
him,” “the mind of Christ within him,” and “the Spirit of God” to guide him in his 
understanding.148  “[N]o man or body of men in these times can be the infallible judges 
or determiners in matters of religion to any other men’s consciences but their own.”149  
This is “God’s own birthday gift to us,” “the true birth-right of every true believer,” the 
“sovereign prerogative” of every kingly individual called to rule in Christ’s church.150  
But the church is more than the sum of its conscientious kingly parishioners just 
as the state is more than the sum of its sovereign individual subjects.  Here Milton 
converted the familiar contract theory of the state into a contract theory of the church as 
well.  Just as each state is voluntarily created by a consensual covenant among like-
interested individuals, so each church is created by “common consent” among “like-
minded believers,” who have “willingly joined themselves in a covenant of union.”151 Just 
as state subjects agree to alienate a portion of their natural rights to elected state 
authorities in order to secure peace, order, and proper rule of law in the community, so 
church members agree to share a portion of their religious rights with other church 
members in order to secure proper preaching, discipline, and diaconal care in their 
communion.  Just as citizens of the state may remove elected political officials who 
betray their office and become tyrants, so parishioners in the church may defrock 
elected church officials who betray the Scripture and become tyrants or heretics.  Just 
as individuals may choose to enter, leave, or abstain from a local political community 
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without compulsion or deterrence, so individuals may choose to enter, exit, or stay 
outside the local church without coercion or penalty.152  
This analogy between the formative contracts of church and state was not 
perfect, of course.  Milton insisted that each church was bound to follow the detailed 
teachings and examples of the Bible in a way that the state was not.  As he read the 
Bible, this meant that preachers, presbyters, and deacons were fine, but that prelates, 
bishops, and monks were not.  It meant that congregational elections for church offices 
were required, and that prelatical or political appointments of clergy were barred.  It 
meant that congregational meetings were expedient, but that general councils were 
unfounded.  It meant the voluntary contributions to the church’s coffers were 
encouraged, but that mandatory tithing of parishioners was banned.153 It meant that 
clerical marriage was allowed, but that mandatory celibacy was not.  It meant that 
clerical proclamations on justice were fine, but that “clerical disturbance in civil affairs”154 
was not.  It meant that church cooperation with the state was licit, but that church 
dependence on the state was perilous.  And it meant that spiritual discipline, even “the 
horrid sentence” of excommunication, was allowed to the church, but that disciplinary 
actions “against the life or limb, or any worldly possession” of church members were 
strictly forbidden to and in the church.155   
In scores of pages, scattered over twenty years of publications, Milton sought to 
prove one-by-one from Scripture that these were the practices and prohibitions that 
Christ decreed for his church.  But he insisted that the exact combination and 
elaboration of these biblical teachings be left entirely to each congregation’s discretion.  
He insisted further that each individual Christian be left free to be a church of one so 
long as he or she lived by the Bible.156  After all, he reminded his readers, while the 
organized church is a good institution ordained by Christ, “the church itself cannot, 
much less the state, settle or impose one title of religion ... but can only recommend or 
propound it to our free and conscientious examination.”157  “No man, no synod, nor 
session of men, though called the church, can judge definitively the sense of Scripture 
to another man’s conscience,” he wrote in 1659.158  Milton – the schoolboy Anglican and 
one-time Presbyterian – was now a committed Congregationalist, with strong 
preferences for church democracy and Christian pluralism and little patience for 
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hierarchical and conciliar churches – whether Anglican, Presbyterian, or Catholic in 
confession.159   
While the church may operate only on the “inner man” and only by “persuasion,” 
Milton continued, the state may act only on the “outward man” and never for religious 
reasons.160  The state was ordained by God and is formed by a political contract for the 
sake of protecting external order and peace and preserving “the people’s rights and 
liberties” -- including notably their religious rights and liberties.161  The state deals 
exclusively with “the body and external faculties of man,” “his life, limbs, and worldly 
possessions.”162  State officials may set limits on how a man may use his life, liberty, 
and property so that the public peace and private rights of others are respected and 
protected.  They may take his goods from him by just taxes or by fine or forfeiture 
following a proper criminal prosecution or civil lawsuit.  They may even use 
proportionate force and violence against the outer man to punish crimes, to right 
wrongs, or to wage wars.163    
But state officials have no power to use force or violence against the inner man 
and his religion.  No person has “power to give them such a commission” in the political 
contract, and the religious “conscience is not [the] province” of the state.164  To the 
contrary, religion is by nature and Scripture the unalienable right of the individual: it 
cannot be given away or taken away by anyone, especially by a state official.  Milton 
returned to this point repeatedly in the later 1640s and 1650s. “Both our belief and 
practice, which comprehend our whole religion, flow from faculties of the inward man, 
free and unconstrained by themselves by nature [and] incapable of force.”165 “[N]either 
traditions nor councils nor canons of any visible church, much less edicts of any 
magistrate or civil session, but the Scripture can be the final judge or rule in matters of 
religion.”166 “If any man,” particularly a political official, “shall pretend that the Scripture 
judges to his conscience for other men, he makes himself greater not only than the 
church, but also than the Scripture, [which is] a presumption too high for any mortal.”167 
“Christ hath a government of his own,” Milton continued, “sufficient of itself to all 
his ends and purposes in governing his church; but much different from that of the civil 
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magistrate.”168  Christ’s government “deals only with the inward man and his actions, 
which are spiritual and to outward force not liable.”169 Through this spiritual government, 
Christ and his church “show us the divine excellence of the spiritual kingdom, able 
without worldly force to subdue all the powers and kingdoms of this world, which are 
upheld by outward [force] only.”170  In this Christian kingdom and spiritual government, 
“the Gospel should not be made a matter of compulsion, and faith, liberty, and 
conscience cannot be.”171  The “civil magistrate has no right” nor can do right “by forcing 
religious things.”172  If he tries, he will get only counterfeit performances and feigned 
exercises of a false faith.173 
It is no answer to this argument, Milton insisted, to point to the example of Old 
Testament judges and kings, who did use state law and coercive force to govern biblical 
Judaism.  That was the time of the Law.  This is the time of the Gospel.  That was a 
time of “bondage and works,” when believers were “children” for whom “force was not 
unbefitting.”174  This is the time of “grace, manhood, freedom and faith; to all which 
belongs willingness and reason, not force.”175  That was a time when the king was 
custodian of the two tables of the Decalogue.  This is a time when the two tables of 
Decalogue are the custodians of us all.  That was a time when church and state were 
united, and when kings had a detailed written law of God to apply and immediate “divine 
direction” to guide them.176  This is a time when church and state are separate, and 
when the law of God lies unwritten in each man’s conscience to be discovered and 
applied for himself.  “If church and state shall be made one flesh again as under the 
law,” said Milton, “let it be with all considered that God who then joined them hath now 
severed them.”177  
It is also no answer to cite Romans 13 and other New Testament passages that 
point out that “the powers that be are ordained by God” and that we must obey them as 
we obey God.178  No one doubts that legitimate authorities deserve obedience, Milton 
allowed, for “without magistrates and civil government there can be no commonwealth, 
no human society, no living in the world.”179  But nothing in Romans 13 “gives judgment 
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or coercive power to magistrates ... in matters of religion.”180  Indeed, a whole series of 
biblical passages state the exact opposite.  Just read John 4:21-23, Romans 14:5, 9-10, 
1 Corinthians 7:23, 9:19, 2 Corinthians 3:17, Galatians 2:16, 4:3, 9-10, 26, 5:13-14, and 
Colossians 2:8, 16, 23, among many other texts, Milton urged.  The force of all these 
biblical texts read together is that we must obey magistrates, but only so long as they 
hold to their political contract and stay within their civil jurisdiction – keeping watch over 
taxes, revenues, crime, warfare and other civil subjects that the New Testament 
identifies by name.  But if magistrates encroach on the spiritual jurisdiction of God, they 
must be resisted by those whom God has ordained as sovereigns of the spiritual realm 
on earth, namely, each and every individual Christian armed with the Gospel and its 
weapons of freedom.181   
It is finally no answer to say that each nation must have an established faith, and 
that the state must work to ensure that the national church remains “schismless.”182  
Nothing in the New Testament commands this, Milton insisted, and nothing in the 
history commends it.  Indeed, it is far better for the state to tolerate a lively plurality of 
Christian churches than to impose “a numb and child-like stupidity of the soul, an 
unactive blindness of mind upon the people by their leaden doctrine” and “to persecute 
all knowing and zealous Christians” who might read Scripture differently.183  Rather than 
let fresh ideas spring forth under the bright light of the Holy Spirit, national religious 
establishments keep the national church in frozen captivity to a counterfeit and  coerced 
uniformity.184 This is no way to discover Christian truth or to prevent religious schism in 
a nation. “The timeliest prevention of schism is to preach the Gospel abundantly and 
powerfully throughout all the land, to instruct the youth religiously, to endeavor how 
Scripture may be easiest understood by all men.”185 Christian truth will come from “a 
free and lawful debate at all times by writing, conference or disputation of what opinion 
soever, disputable by Scripture.”186 If such sincere, honest, and open disputation on 
Scripture is not only tolerated but encouraged by the state, Milton argued, God will 
determine what is truth and what is falsehood and heresy.187  Indeed, God’s truth will 
eventually come riding triumphantly down “a lane of sects and heresies on each 
side.”188   
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The state has but two tasks in policing this lane of Christian truth, said Milton.  
First, the state must respect and tolerate the religious worship and exercise of each and 
every sect that is founded and grounded in Scripture -- however erroneous their 
Scriptural interpretation may appear to be. Only sects that are not peaceable and that 
violate the life, limb, and worldly possessions of their own members or any other can be 
subject to state sanction and control.189  But second, the state must outlaw and 
“extirpate” heretics, whom Milton variously defined as “enemies of the Gospel,” and 
those who “maintain traditions or opinions not probable by Scripture.”190  In his earlier 
writings, Milton hinted vaguely that the class of heretics included Jews, Muslims, 
“atheists” and those given to “popery, and open superstition.”191  By 1659, he had 
narrowed his charge of heresy to one: “the papist only; he is the only heretic,” for he 
“counts all heretics but himself.”192   
Before the Reformation, Milton wrote bitterly, Catholics took “the virgin Truth” of 
Scripture, and “hewed her lovely form into a thousand pieces, and scattered them to the 
four winds.”193 Since the Protestant Reformation, and despite its lessons, Catholics 
continue to “exact” their own beliefs and practices “above Scripture” and “against all 
Scripture” and denounce “anathemas” on any who do not follow the pope and the 
prelatical councils whom they have put in Christ’s place at the head of the church.194  
Catholicism is not so much “a religion, but a Roman principality,” “a Catholic heresy 
against Scripture, supported mainly by a civil, and except in Rome, by a foreign power; 
justly therefore to be suspected not tolerated by the magistrate of another country.”195  
Indeed, “all men who are true Protestants ... know not a more immediate and killing 
subverter of all true religion than Antichrist, whom they generally believe to be the pope 
and Church of Rome.  [H]e who makes peace with this grand enemy and persecutor of 
the true church, he who joins with him, strengthens him, gives him root to grow and 
spread his poison.”196 
Milton’s theory of religious rights and liberties thus remained very Protestant both 
in inspiration and in application.  His theory was based, in part, on a profound critique of 
the Catholic tradition, and its vestiges as he saw them in his Anglican and Protestant 
world.  Milton denounced, with as much vehemence as Martin Luther had done in his 
early years, the purported sacramental idolatry, theological superstitions, human 
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traditions, canon laws, ecclesiastical courts, and prelatical hierarchies that for so long 
dominated the church.197  He also denounced Constantinianism, that fourth-century 
superstition that traded the simple truths and democratic structures of the early church 
for a Latinized and Romanized tyrannical state church wholly abstracted from the 
Scripture, forcibly imposed on the people, and utterly devoid of anything but greed, 
corruption, and craven dependence.  Since Constantine, the church has suffered “many 
dark ages, wherein the huge overshadowing train of error had almost swept all the stars 
out of the firmament.”198    
It was the Protestant Reformation, Milton insisted, that first “struck through the 
black and settled night of ignorance and anti-Christian tyranny.”199  It was Wycliff, Hus, 
Zwingli, Luther, Calvin, Bucer, Martyr, Ponet, Knox, Goodman, Gilby, and other 
reformers who dared to dissent from the religious establishment in order to bring “bright 
and blissful Reformation (by divine power).”200  Through their efforts “the sacred Bible 
was brought out of the dusty corners where profane falsehood and neglect had thrown 
it, the schools opened, the divine and human learning raked out of the embers of 
forgotten tongues.”201 It was the Protestant reformers who used the Bible to “set up a 
standard for the recovery of lost Truth,” who blew “the first evangelical trumpet to the 
nations, holding up, as from a hill, the new lamp of saving light to all Christendom.”202  It 
was the reformers who gave the church the vernacular Bible, and who claimed it the 
fundamental right and duty of each and every Christian to read and interpret the Bible 
under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit.  It was the reformers who called Christians to 
find their vocations in the world, to answer God’s call to be prophets, priests, and kings 
in imitation and service of Christ.203  
While these early Protestant teachings have found ready application in Lutheran 
Germany and Scandinavia and in Calvinist Switzerland, France, the Netherlands, and 
Scotland, England has not had “a complete reform” Milton lamented.204  Henry VIII and 
his successors ultimately replaced one tyrant for another at the head of the church, and 
retained too many “rotten principles,” “popish corruption” and “idolatrous pollutions” of 
Catholicism.205  But God has “ever had this island under the special indulgent eye of his 
providence.”206  And now God, a century after the Reformation first broke out, is calling 
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England to a second “further Reformation,” a “holier” and “better” Reformation.207 Its 
“common rule and touchstone is the Scripture” to be applied with “more conscience, 
more equity, [and] more Protestantly” than ever before.208   
The Reformation of religious rights and liberties that Milton envisioned for 
England, however, was more radical than anything that obtained on the Protestant 
Continent, and more sweeping than most of his fellow English Calvinists could 
countenance.  For Milton, the achievement of “real and substantial” religious liberty 
required five major reforms.209  First, and foremost, religious liberty required liberty of 
conscience for all peaceable biblical believers, the liberty of each person to search out 
and act on the natural law within him and the biblical texts before him without coercion, 
control, or penalty from either church or state.  Liberty of conscience, Milton wrote, is 
our “dearest and most precious” right.210 Second, religious liberty meant freedom of the 
individual to worship, dispute, and publish freely on the strength of his faith, and 
freedom to enter and exit a church and community of his own choice or to forgo church 
association altogether. Third, religious liberty meant state toleration of every peaceable 
church that was grounded, however unusually, on a sincere and earnest interpretation 
of the Bible (Catholics notably excluded).  Fourth, religious liberty meant separation of 
the offices and operations of church and state, leaving the church free to organize and 
support itself voluntarily and democratically, and relieving the state of the burden of 
collecting tithes, operating courts, or maintaining properties on the church’s behalf.  
Finally, religious liberty required that there be no legal establishment of a single national 
religion, but instead a free and open disputation in the nation of a plurality of religions 
based on Scripture.   
Here, in prototypical Protestant form, Milton had set out the core principles of 
religious liberty that would come to dominant the common law in the following centuries 
– liberty of conscience, free exercise of religion, equality of a plurality of faiths before 
the law, separation of church and state, and (outside of England) disestablishment of a 
national religion.211  Each of these five principles of religious liberty set forth by Milton 
had ardent advocates among other English Calvinists of his day.  Some fellow 
reformers pressed one or two of these principles further than Milton dared, particularly 
in advocating toleration for Catholics and in criticizing the church’s power of 
excommunication which Milton still supported.  But few Calvinists embraced all five of 
these religious liberty principles together, or cast them in such stridently individualistic 
terms as Milton.  Most Presbyterians and some Independents, such as Samuel 
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Rutherford, Henry Ireton, and John Goodwin, embraced liberty of conscience and 
toleration for all Protestants and called for some measure of separation between church 
and state and democratic election within each.  But they also still maintained a religious 
establishment and insisted on state contributions to religion.  Some Levellers and 
Diggers, like Richard Overton and Gerrard Winstanley, went further than Milton in 
calling for toleration of Catholics, Jews, and various peaceable non-biblical religions.  
But even these reformers ultimately did not abandon the idea of a legally-established 
religion and state-supported church.  Only the most radical reformers of his day, John 
Lilburne, John Saltmarsh, William Walwyn, and Roger Williams, could stand comfortably 
on every plank of the platform of religious liberty that Milton had built.212  But none 
anchored this platform as firmly as Milton did -- save Roger Williams.  Ten years before 
Milton became active, however, Williams had already left for Puritan New England.  
Banished from there because of his liberal views, had established his own colony of 
Providence in 1636.  Williams founded Providence as “a lively experiment [for] full 
liberty in religious concernments" which guaranteed "liberty of conscience" and "the free 
exercise and enjoyment of all their civil and religious rights" to all peaceable parties.  He 
also in 1643 called for "a wall of separation between the garden of the Church and the 
wilderness of the world."213  Parliament would eventually group Milton and Williams 
together as radicals who deserved censorship, as we shall in a moment. 
Just because of the radicality of these religious liberty principles taken together, 
and just because of the suspect theological pedigree of some of these principles and 
their proponents, Milton’s views did not carry the day in his life time.  Indeed, they were 
often cavalierly ignored by other Puritan reformers.214  Even Oliver Cromwell, who 
supported Milton and appointed him as his Secretary for Foreign Languages, could not 
adopt his principles for religious liberty despite Milton’s repeated prodding.215  The 
Restoration government in 1660 rejected every one of them out of hand, and returned 
England to a firm Anglican state establishment, featuring vicious repression of 
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dissenters.  But three decades later, in the Glorious Revolution, Miltonian religious 
liberty principles came to constitutional form in the famous Toleration Act of 1689 and to 
even more vivid expression in John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration.216  
III. Domestic Rights and Liberties 
While Milton’s call for the reformation of religious liberty proved three decades 
before its time, his call for the reformation of domestic liberty would prove three 
centuries before its time.  But a guarantee of domestic liberty was for Milton a “ready 
and easy” next step in the struggle for “real and substantial liberty” in England – from 
the liberty of the private prayer closet to the liberty of the private home itself.217 In 
Milton’s view, private households of his day, just like individual consciences, were being 
oppressed by church and state authorities – and on the basis of the same kind of bad 
theology, superstitious custom, and unjust law.  It made little sense to call for the 
reformation of public liberties in church and state, he argued, without first having the 
private liberties of the English household in order.  “What are all our public immunities 
and privileges worth, and how shall it be judged that we fight for them with minds worthy 
to enjoy them, if we suffer ourselves in the meanwhile not to understand the most 
important freedom that God and nature hath given us in the family.”218   
[T]he constitution and reformation of a commonwealth ... is, 
like a building, to begin orderly from the foundation thereof, 
which is marriage and the family, to set right first whatever is 
amiss therein.  How can there else grow up a race of 
warrantable men, while the house and home that breeds 
them, is troubled and disquieted under a bondage not of God’s 
constraining ... but laid upon us imperiously in the worst and 
weakest ages of knowledge, by a canonical tyranny of stupid 
and malicious monks: who having rashly vowed themselves 
to a single life, which they could not undergo, invented new 
fetters to throw on matrimony, that the world thereby waxing 
more dissolute, they also in a general looseness might sin with 
more favor.219   
This argument had intuitive appeal in Protestant England – and not just because 
of its popular anti-monasticism.  Marriage had been one of the first institutions to be 
reformed in the sixteenth-century Reformation, and it made good sense to any serious 
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Protestant that a “second reformation” would also need to begin with marriage and the 
family.220  Moreover, it was a commonplace among both Anglicans and Calvinists of 
Milton’s day to regard the marital household as the foundation of church and the state 
and the first school of order, justice, and good citizenship.  Already in 1590, William 
Perkins put it thus: "[M]arriage was made and appointed by God himself to be the 
foundation and seminary of all sorts and kinds of life in the commonwealth and the 
church.... [T]hose families wherein the service of God is performed are, as it were, little 
churches; yea, even a kind of paradise on earth."221 Robert Cleaver opened his famous 
1598 tract, A Godly Form of Householde Gouernment, with an oft-repeated maxim: "A 
household is as it were a little commonwealth, by the good government whereof, God’s 
glory may be advanced, the commonwealth which standeth of several families, 
benefited, and all that live in that family, may receive much comfort and commodity."222  
William Gouge premised his massive 1622 tome Domestic Duties on the same belief 
that "the family is a seminary of the church and the commonwealth," and indeed in its 
own right, "a little church, and a little commonwealth, whereby a trial may be made of 
such as are fit for any place of authority, or subjection in church or commonwealth."223   
It was not so much Calvinist logic as personal crisis, however, that drove Milton 
to pay close attention to domestic liberty and marital reform.  In 1642, just as he had 
completed the last of his five tracts calling for religious liberty, Milton had gotten 
married.  His new bride, however, had left him within a month of their wedding day, and 
she and her family repeatedly resisted his attempts at reconciliation.  Milton, his early 
biographer reports, "could ill bear the disappointment he met with by her obstinate 
absenting: And therefore thought upon a divorce, that he might be free to marry 
another."224   
English church courts, which had long enjoyed jurisdiction over marriage until the 
Long Parliament banished them in 1641, maintained the strict medieval canon law that 
forbad divorce and remarriage.  Parties who had been properly married could not 
divorce on any grounds whatsoever -- even in cases of brazen adultery or malicious 
desertion, which other Protestant nations recognized to be sufficient grounds for divorce 
and remarriage.  Under English law, estranged spouses could separate from bed and 
board on these grounds.  But they could not marry another person during the lifetime of 
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their spouse without courting charges of bigamy, a serious criminal offense.  Their only 
hope for escape was to find an impediment – such as an incestuous blood tie between 
them – that would support a judgment of annulment.  Annulment was a formal 
declaration that the purported marriage was null and void from the start, in most cases 
leaving each party free to marry another.225  None of these options was available to 
Milton, and he felt unjustly enslaved in and to his marriage.   
Thus, invoking "the right of nature and the liberty wherein I was born,"226 Milton 
took his cause to the Parliament -- addressing four books to them between 1643 and 
1646 in an effort to convince them that he should be allowed to divorce and remarry in 
such circumstances.  In his Address to Parliament, which opened his first tract, The 
Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, Milton pressed a contractual argument for the right 
to divorce that followed the exact lines that Parliament had just used to justify their right 
to revolt against King Charles. 
He who marries, intends as little to conspire his own ruin, as 
he that swears allegiance [to the Crown]: and as a whole 
people is in proportion to an ill government, so is one man to 
an ill marriage.  If [Parliament]  against any authority, 
covenant, or statute, may by the sovereign edict of charity, 
save not only their lives, but honest liberties from unworthy 
bondage, as well may [the married man] against any private 
covenant, which he never entered to his mischief, redeem 
himself from unsupportable disturbances to honest peace, 
and just contentment: And much the rather, for that to resist 
the highest magistrate though tyrannizing, God never gave us 
express allowance, only he gave us reason, charity, nature, 
and good example to bear us out; but in this economical [that 
is, domestic] misfortune, thus to demean ourselves, besides 
the warrant of those four great directors, which doth as justly 
belong hither, we have an express law of God, and such a 
law, as whereof our Savior with a solemn threat forbid the 
abrogating.  For no effect of tyranny can sit more heavily on 
the commonwealth, then this household unhappiness on the 
family.  And farewell all hope of true Reformation in the state, 
while such an evil as this lies undiscerned and unregarded in 
the house.227   
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This was Milton's argument in a nutshell.  The domestic commonwealth, like the political 
commonwealth, is formed by a contract or covenant between two parties, which may be 
dissolved if it fails in its fundamental purpose.  This is the counsel of the “four great 
directors” -- reason, charity, nature, and experience -- in the case of political 
dissolutions.  It is counseled by these same four great directors as well as by the Bible 
in the case of marital dissolutions.  If such counsel is ignored, the whole commonwealth 
will suffer and each member within it.  
The purpose of forming a political commonwealth is to protect liberty, establish 
order, and secure peace, Milton argued, adumbrating arguments that he would 
elaborate in his later regicide tracts.  When one or more of these purposes is 
irreconcilably frustrated, either by the tyranny of rulers or by the crime of subjects, the 
political commonwealth is broken, and either the rulers or the people may dissolve it -- 
by force of arms, if necessary.  Thereafter, the parties can reorganize their political 
polity in a manner more consistent with the ideal purposes of liberty, order, and peace.  
It makes no difference that the political covenant between the people and their rulers is 
silent on the subject of dissolution in cases of frustration of the main purpose of the 
covenant.  For both common sense and natural law are implied in the covenant and 
dictate that parties not be unconscionably held to bargains that were once right but have 
now gone irretrievably wrong:  
No understanding man can be ignorant that covenants are 
ever made according to the present state of persons and of 
things; and have ever the more general laws of nature and of 
reason included in them, though not expressed.  If I make a 
voluntary covenant as with a man, to do him good, and he 
prove afterward a monster to me, I should conceive a 
disobligement.  If I covenant, not to hurt an enemy, in favor of 
him and forbearance, and hope of his amendment, and he, 
after that, shall do me tenfold injury and mischief, to what he 
had done when I so covenanted, and still be plotting what may 
tend to my destruction, I question not but that his after actions 
release me; nor know I [a] covenant so sacred that withholds 
me from demanding justice on him.  Howbeit, had not their 
distrust in a good cause, and the fast and loose of our 
prevaricating Divines overswayed, it had been doubtless 
better not to have inserted in a covenant unnecessary 
obligations, and words not works of a supererogatory 
allegiance to their enemy....  Protestants have done before, 




than once besought the Parliament to do, that they might go 
on upon a sure foundation.228 
Milton pressed the analogous argument in seeking “a sure foundation” from 
Parliament to reject those “prevaricating Divines” against divorce and to grant him a 
“disobligement” of his marital contract because it had failed in its fundamental 
purpose.229  The purpose of forming a marriage, Milton argued, is to foster love, create 
community, deter lust, and procreate children.  Of these purposes, marital love is, by 
far, the most critical. "Marriage is a covenant," he wrote, "the very being whereof 
consists, not in forced cohabitation, and counterfeit performance, but unfeigned love 
and peace ... and sweet and gladsome society."230  "[T]he apt and cheerful conversation 
of man with woman," is the "chief and noblest purpose of marriage."231  "Where love 
cannot be, there can be left of wedlock nothing but the empty husk of an outside 
matrimony" -- dry, shriveled, and dispensable.232 
Milton underscored this priority of marital love by describing marriage as a 
threefold society -- at once religious, civil, and corporal in nature.  As a religious society, 
marriage is a union of soul, spirit, and mind, between husband and wife -- a reflection of 
the perfect love of Adam and Eve in Paradise, an expression of the perfect love 
between Christ and his church.  As a civil society, marriage is a union of the couple's 
person and property, in which each spouse vows to support and protect the other in all 
things until death.  As a corporal society, marriage is a union of bodies in intercourse 
which serve to cool their passion and to conceive children if that is God’s will.233 
God appointed “the religious society" of marriage as "the highest and most 
excellent," Milton argued, for it dealt with the essential matters of the soul, the spirit, and 
the mind.234  He appointed the corporal society of marriage as the "last and meanest," 
for this dealt with discretionary matters of the body and its passions.235  "We know that 
flesh can neither join, nor keep together two bodies of itself; what is it then must make 
them one flesh, but likeness, but fitness of mind and disposition, which may breed the 
Spirit of concord, and union between them?...  For as the unity of mind is nearer and 
greater than the union of bodies, so doubtless is the dissimilitude greater, and more 
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individual."236  Without agape or soul love, a marriage is dead.  Without eros or carnal 
love, a marriage can live.  Think of the marriage of Mary and Joseph.237   
Having posited this hierarchy of marital purposes -- from the religious to the 
carnal -- Milton thought it "preposterous ignorance and iniquity" that the law of his day 
should provide remedies "for the rights of the body in marriage but nothing for the 
wrongs and grievances of the mind."238 Impotence and frigidity could lead to annulment.  
But frustration of "the superior and nobler ends both of marriage and the married 
persons ...  looses no persons" from marriage.239  "What courts of concupiscence are 
these, wherein fleshly appetite is heard before right reason, lust before love or 
devotion."240  If impotence, frigidity, and other frustrations of the base carnal society of 
marriage can lead to dissolution, then surely incompatibility, antagonism, and other 
frustrations of the higher religious society of marriage should lead to dissolution as well.  
To hold otherwise is to elevate the needs of the body above those of the soul, to 
privilege marital sex over marital love.241 
Milton thus advocated divorce if either the religious or the carnal purposes of 
marriage were frustrated.  Frustration of the religious purposes of marriage because of 
irreconcilable incompatibility provided the more compelling case for divorce, he 
believed.  For the community and concordance of the couple's soul, spirit, and mind was 
the first and foremost reason God instituted marriage.  Adam could not abide isolation, 
even in the perfection of Paradise; no person can abide it in this vale of tears.  And, a 
person trapped in a marriage with "a mute and spiritless mate" is even lonelier than the 
unmarried person.242 The disaffected spouse becomes cold, dark, and sad, growing "not 
only in bitterness and wrath, the canker of devotion, but in a desperate and vicious 
carelessness," falling victim to "dissimulation, suspicion, false colors, false 
pretenses."243 In such circumstances, divorce is the better course.  Who cannot see 
"how much more Christian it would be to break by divorce that which is more broken by 
undue and forcible keeping ... rather than that the whole worship of a Christian man’s 
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Frustration of the carnal purposes of marriage should likewise lead to divorce, 
Milton argued.  In some instances, spouses willfully betray their bodies through adultery, 
cruelty, desertion, drunkenness, incest, sloth, violent crime, or other pathos that 
destroys any prospects of intimacy with their spouse.  In other instances, one spouse 
suffers permanent impotence, frigidity, contagion, sterility, or disfigurement that 
precludes intercourse or conception.  Where married parties cannot reconcile 
themselves to these conditions, they must be allowed to divorce, Milton argued.  For, 
unless the innocent or capable spouse is "heroically virtuous," he or she inevitably will 
"despair in virtue and mutiny against divine providence" -- testing the neighbor's bed, 
visiting the local brothel, or succumbing to various other "temptations, and occasions to 
secret adulteries, and unchaste roving."245  Husbands, eager to perpetuate their family 
name, might be tempted to concubinage for the sake of having children -- a temptation 
to which even the great patriarch Abraham succumbed to his own misery as well as that 
of his wife Sara, and his mistress Hagar and her illegitimate son Ishmael.246  And, if the 
couple already has children, the ills and evils of their marital discord will "undoubtedly 
redound upon the children ... and the whole family.  It degenerates and disorders the 
best spirits, leaves them to unsettled imaginations, and degraded hopes, careless of 
themselves, their household and their friends, unactive to all public service, dead to the 
commonwealth."247   
"[T]o enjoin the indissoluble keeping of a marriage found unfit against the good of 
man both soul and body," Milton concluded, "is to make an idol of marriage."248  To be 
sure, "divorce is not rashly to be made, but reconcilement to be persuaded and 
endeavored."249  But, if such reconciliation cannot be achieved, it is better to take the 
painful step of divorce, to avoid even worse pain.  This is for the good of the couple, 
their children, and the broader commonwealth.  "[P]eace and love, the best subsistence 
of a Christian family, will return home from whence they are now banished; places of 
prostitution will be less haunted, the neighbor’s bed less attempted, the yoke of prudent 
and manly discipline will be generally submitted to, sober and well ordered living will 
soon spring up in the commonwealth."250  
Milton did not spell out the legal ramifications of these views on marriage and 
divorce.  He instead reprinted, with his own long preface, the legal discussion of 
marriage and divorce in the tract De Regno Christi written by Strasbourg reformer 
Martin Bucer in 1550.  Milton endorsed Bucer's conflation of annulment and divorce, his 
insistence on the equal rights of husband and wife to petition for divorce on proof of 
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cause, and his call for civil courts rather than church courts to handle all marriage and 
divorce litigation.251  Milton also assembled a rather untidy heap of liberal divorce laws -- 
from the ancient Judaic to the modern Protestant -- to demonstrate the purported 
anachronism of prevailing English law against divorce.252  Readers who wanted more, 
Milton said, should read the systematic legal discussion on the subject just published by 
the distinguished English jurist John Selden.253 
Milton directed his main energies to the theological ramifications of these views 
of marriage and divorce.  He spent a good deal of time deconstructing the conventional 
theological arguments for the indissolubility of marriage -- dismissing them all derisively 
as the kinds of "silly superstition," "devilish doctrine," and "heinous barbarism" that a 
commonwealth dedicated to true liberty could not countenance.254 Catholics first called 
marriage a sacrament because it is permanent, he argued, and then later insisted that 
marriage is permanent because it is sacrament, a sign of Christ's union with his Church.  
But this sacramental symbolism of marriage only proves that it is the spiritual, rather 
than the corporal, union of marriage that is critical, Milton insisted.  "For me I dispute not 
now whether matrimony be a mystery or no; if it be of Christ and his Church, certainly it 
is not meant of every ungodly and miswedded marriage, but then only mysterious, when 
it is a holy, happy, and peaceful match.... Since therefore none but a fit and pious 
matrimony can signify the union of Christ and his Church, there cannot be any 
hindrance of divorce to that wedlock wherein there can be no good mystery."255 
Continental Protestants argue that marriage is indissoluble because it is a 
covenant in which God is a party.  But this, again, proves only that the spiritual 
dimensions of marriage are the more pressing, Milton wrote.  If marriage is a true 
covenant among husband, wife, and God, "so much the more it argues the chief society 
thereof to be in the soul rather than in the body, and the greatest breach thereof to be 
unfitness of mind rather than defect of body, for the body can have less affinity in a 
covenant more than human."256 Moreover, to call marriage a covenant is not to prove its 
indissolubility; quite the contrary, as is evident from the dissolved political covenants of 
our time, let alone every private covenant that can be dissolved for cause.  "[E]quity is 
understood in every covenant, even between enemies, though the terms be not 
expressed.  If equity therefore made it, extremity may dissolve it.  But marriage, they 
used to say, is the covenant of God.  Undoubted: and so is any covenant frequently 
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called in Scripture, wherein God is called as witness.... [T]his denomination adds 
nothing to the covenant of marriage, above any other civil and solemn contract: nor is it 
more indissoluble for this reason than any other against the end of its own ordination....  
But faith they say must be kept in covenant, though to our damage.  I answer, that only 
holds true when the other side performs."257 
Anglicans are even less convincing, Milton charged, for they "dare not affirm that 
marriage is either a sacrament, or a mystery, though all those sacred things give place 
to man, and yet they invest it with such an awful sanctity, and give it such Adamantine 
chains, to bind with, as if it were to be worshipped like some Indian deity."258  But this is 
an irrational and silly conformity to one particular of the Catholic tradition which in many 
other particulars has been rejected.   
Both Catholics and Protestants alike argue that marriage is indissoluble because 
Christ commands that “what God has joined together let not man put asunder.”259  The 
point of this passage, however, said Milton, is not the prohibition against man's putting 
asunder.  It is the requirement that God must join the couple together. "[W]hen is it that 
God may be said to join,” Milton asked rhetorically; “when the parties and their friends 
consent?  No surely; for that may concur to lewdest ends, or is it when church rites are 
finished?  Neither; for the efficacy of those depends upon the presupposed fitness of 
either party.  Perhaps after carnal knowledge? least of all: for that may join persons 
whom neither law nor nature dares join; ‘tis left, that only then, when the minds are fitly 
disposed, and enabled to maintain a cheerful conversation, to the solace and love of 
each other, according as God intended and promised in the very first foundation of 
matrimony, I will make a help meet for him."260  "So when it shall be found by their 
apparent unfitness, that their continuing to be man and wife is against the glory of God, 
and their mutual happiness, it may assure them that God never joined them."261   
Having deconstructed traditional Christian arguments about divorce, Milton set 
out to reconstruct a biblical argument for the right to divorce.  The key passage, he 
insisted is Deuteronomy 24:1-4.262 There God proclaimed through Moses: “When a man 
hath taken a wife and married her, and it come to pass that she find no favor in his 
eyes, because he hath found some uncleanness in her, let him write her a bill of 
divorcement, and give it in her hand, and send her out of his house” -- leaving both 
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parties free to remarry thereafter.263  “Uncleanness” in this passage, said Milton, means 
"nakedness or unfitness" of body or of mind.264  It implicates the whole range of corporal 
and religious grounds for divorce which he had already listed.  Of these, religious 
grounds were the more important, for "what greater nakedness or unfitness of mind than 
that which hinders ever the solace and peaceful society of the marital couple."265  The 
ancient Hebrews had recognized this, and built on this passage a comprehensive 
doctrine of divorce.  Their interpretation was followed by the Greeks, the Romans, the 
early Christian emperors, and many others.  This proves, said Milton, that Deuteronomy 
24:1-4 is no special rule for the Jews.  It is a universal moral law, "a grave and prudent 
law, full of moral equity, full of due consideration towards nature, that cannot be 
resisted; a law consenting with the laws of wisest men and civilest nations."266 
Christ did not abrogate this moral law of divorce in his proclamation in Matthew 
19:9: "Whosever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry 
another, committeth adultery; and whosoever marrieth her which is put away doth 
commit adultery."  This passage must be understood in context, Milton argued.  Christ 
had already said in Matthew 5:18: "Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall 
in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled."  Moreover, his divorce proclamation was 
prompted, as Matthew 19:3 reports, by the Pharisees tempting him, and saying unto 
him, “Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause?"  Christ was giving a 
direct response to the scheming pharisees.  You, pharisees, who might "in the hardness 
of your hearts" abuse the Mosaic law of divorce through inventive interpretation, you 
may divorce only on grounds of fornication.267  But others, less hard of heart and less 
prone to casuistry, may do so on the fuller grounds allowed by Moses.  Christ's "rigid 
sentence against divorce" was designed "not to cut off all remedy from a good man who 
finds himself consuming away in a disconsolate and unenjoyed matrimony, but to lay a 
bridle upon the bold abuses of those overweening rabbis."268  Christ's words were not a 
timeless declaration for the church, but a terse denunciation of the Pharisees who were 
testing him.269  
If Christ's words are so understood, Milton continued, St. Paul's words can also 
be understood.  In I Corinthians 7:15, Paul writes: "if the unbelieving [spouse] depart, let 
him depart.  A brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases, but God hath 
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called us to peace."  Paul is not contradicting Christ by adding desertion or disbelief as 
another ground for marital dissolution, Milton argued.  He is simply confirming the 
traditional Hebrew practice that when the union of spirit between husband and wife is 
broken by a form of spiritual "uncleanness," the marriage is broken and the parties are 
freed from its bonds.270  Indeed, Paul goes beyond Moses by granting to both husband 
and wife alike this freedom to depart from a spiritually broken marriage -- a suitable 
application of Paul's more general teaching that in Christ there is "neither male nor 
female."271  
This was the heart of Milton’s argument for domestic liberty.  Over the next fifteen 
years, he embroidered these arguments a bit more.  He called for the equal rights of 
men and women to enter marriages as to exit them through divorce.  He called on 
husband and wives to love, support and care for each other, and insisted that each had 
a right to claim these expanded conjugal debts from the other.  He called for the rights 
of parents to nurture, discipline, and educate their children in their own faith but with due 
regard for each child’s nature and gifts.  He mentioned the need for greater privacy of 
the home, including, as we shall see,272 freedom from illegal searches of the home and 
seizure of private papers.  And he speculated, at some length and leisure, whether 
polygamy and concubinage were, in fact, outlawed by God, though he said clearly that 
“homosexuality, fornication, violation, adultery, incest, rape, prostitution, and offences of 
a similar kind run counter” to God’s law and cannot be countenanced at all.273   
Unlike his writings on religious liberty, which were often ignored in his day, 
Milton’s writings on domestic liberty found instant readership – and mostly of a very 
hostile sort.  Even before he ventured his scandalous speculations on polygamy and 
concubinage, his readers denounced his permissive theory of marriage and divorce.  
While many writers could accept the conventional Protestant doctrine of divorce and 
remarriage in cases of adultery and desertion, they thought Milton's arguments for the 
right to divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences alone proved too much.  His 
books were dismissed for holding the "most dangerous and damnable tenets."274  If 
Milton had his way, his critics charged, "the bonds of marriage [will be] let loose to 
inordinate lust," and men will inevitably "quit of their wives for slight occasions" to the 
detriment of the couple, the children, the church, and the commonwealth alike. "[W]hat 
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will all the Christian churches through the world ... think of our woeful degeneration in 
these deplored times, that so uncouth a design should be set on foot among us."275 
The 1644 Parliament not only rejected Milton’s four-fold call for divorce reform, 
but moved to censor and burn his Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, along with Roger 
Williams’s Bloody Tenent of Persecution and Richard Overton’s Man’s Mortallitie.  
These books, critics in Parliament and in pulpits pronounced, have converted religious 
and domestic liberties into “despicable licenses.”276  These authors want “a liberty of 
sensual lusts, and fleshly looseness,” a freedom for “Popery, Judaism, Turkism, 
Paganism and all manner of false religions under pretense of liberty of conscience.”277  
Their books are chock-full of “Anabaptistical, Antinomian, Heretical, Atheistical opinions, 
as of the soul’s mortality, divorce at pleasure, etc.”278 “If any plead conscience for the 
lawfulness of polygamy; (or for divorce for other cause than Christ and His apostles 
mention; of which a wicked book is abroad and uncensured, though deserving to be 
burnt, whose author hath been so impudent as to set his name to it, and dedicate it to 
ourselves) or for liberty to marry incestuously, will you grant toleration for this?”279  Later 
English reformers, both theological and legal, would look back to Milton as a prophet, 
who anticipated many of reforms of English marriage and divorce law from the 
Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 forward.280  But in his own day, on questions of 
marriage and divorce, Milton was a prophet with little honor, and no legal influence. 
 
IV. Civil Rights and Liberties 
It was the threat in 1644 of Parliamentary censorship of his book on divorce that 
prompted Milton immediately to widen his reformation program to include other civil 
liberties, most notably the freedoms of speech and press.  These were not entirely new 
ideas; Milton had already sounded a few of them in his earlier tracts on religious liberty.  
“Nothing is more sweet to man” than freedom of speaking and writing, he wrote in 
1641.281  But for the free born people of England, all free speaking and free publication 
have long been “pinched,” “girded, and straight laced” by “monkish prohibitions, and 
expurgatious indexes” kept by “some mercenary, narrow-souled, and illiterate 
chaplain.”282  Censorship is silly and self-defeating for the church, Milton argued.  It is 
silly because censors have “to thrust themselves under disguise into a popular throng 
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[or] to stand the night long under eaves of houses and low windows that they might hear 
everywhere the free utterances of private breasts.”283 It is self-defeating because “the 
honest liberty” of free speech” is “so dear a concernment as the church’s good.”284 For 
with it honest men can stand up for the church’s defense and drive her to reform.285  
Indeed, the church and the nation would do so much better if they welcomed “the 
struggle of contrarieties,” “the fierce encounter of Truth and falsehood.”286  For “the 
property of Truth is, where she is publicly taught, to unyoke and set free the minds and 
spirits of a nation first from the thralls of sin and superstition, after which all honest and 
legal freedom of civil life cannot be long absent.”287  
Milton returned to these arguments in 1643 in his preface to The Doctrine and 
Discipline of Divorce.  Even before he had any inkling of the pending censorship of this 
work, he fumed against those with a “design to envy and cry down the industry of free 
reasoning ... and innovation.”288  Why have the censors of church and state “closed up” 
“the womb of teeming Truth”?289  It is only because she may “presume to bring forth 
ought, that sorts not with their unchewed notions and superstitions.”290 “[Y]ou now have 
in your hands a great and populous nation to reform,” Milton wrote to Parliament, “from 
what corruption, what blindness in religion you know well; in what a degenerate and 
fallen spirit from the apprehension of native liberty.”291 
Freedom of Speech.  It takes a bit of historical imagination and explanation to 
appreciate the object of Milton’s complaints and the radicality of his vision of “the fierce 
encounter of Truth and falsehood” through free speech in public.  Before 1640 in 
England, truth was not so much debated as declared, and public platforms and 
publications for doing so were reserved to those licensed by the government.  To be 
sure, England knew the classical Greek and Roman teachings on rhetorica, parrhesia 
and licentia, and these ancient ideas were given ample ventilation by scholars of the 
day.292  A century before, in the heady days of Henry VIII’s reformation, Protestants and 
humanists alike had exploited these earlier rhetorical traditions as well as the prophetic 
traditions of the Bible to issue their many sermons and pamphlets.  But with the 
Elizabethan settlement in 1559, and even more with the establishment policies of 
James I from 1603 on, much of this radical rhetoric was subject to increasing restriction. 
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The dominant legal assumption, though not always the social reality, was that public 
and published speech required prior government licenses.293   
The proper place for freedom of speech, petition, and debate was thought to be 
in Parliament.  There, traditions going back to the thirteenth century gave members 
license to speak freely, frankly, and forcefully within the confidence of their chambers in 
order to offer their best counsel to the Crown and to craft the best policies for the 
Commonwealth.  Thus, when King James I and King Charles I suspended the 
Parliaments for a time and then tried to curtail the speech of its members when called, 
Parliament rose up in indignant protest.  The members issued several striking 
documents defending these ancient rights of free Parliamentary speech.  “The Form of 
Apology and Satisfaction” of 1604, for example, declared to James I that these 
Parliamentary “privileges and liberties” were not a “mere privilege” that could be 
restricted or removed by the Crown.  “Full and frank speech” was a “fundamental 
privilege,” “our right and due inheritance, no less than our very lands and goods.”294   
When King James I again sought to curtail this freedom of speech, Sir Edward 
Coke confronted him in an epic speech in the House of Commons in 1621.  Members of 
Parliament, Coke declared, have an “ancient right” and “undoubted inheritance” to a 
“freedom to speak what we think good for government, either in church or 
commonwealth and what are the grievances” therein that need be redressed.295  Citing 
the Magna Carta of 1215 and several later medieval statutes and cases, Coke argued 
that Parliament must represent and speak for the whole people, and thus that “the 
freedom of the House is the freedom of the whole land.”  “We serve here for thousands 
and ten thousands.”296 Such views, which landed Coke and other members in prison, 
figured prominently in the formal Commons’ “Protestation” of 1621 and were echoed 
again in the many speeches surrounding the Petition of Right of 1628.297 Anyone who 
wanted more could read with profit the pages on point in Coke’s Institutes.298  
Even as restricted, the laws governing freedom of speech in Parliament were 
considerably more liberal than those governing public speech, especially publication.  
For a private person to print a book was akin to minting a coin; it always required a prior 
government license.  Without a license, the publication was presumed a counterfeit, and 
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printing, selling, or possessing it was an actionable crime.299  King Henry VIII had put 
such a licensing law in place already in 1530, and this early law was broadened and 
tightened in a dozen later acts culminating in Charles I’s Star Chamber Decree of 1637.  
Under this latter law, the Crown’s Stationers’ Company issued the licenses to print, the 
Bishop of London or Archbishop of Canterbury office reviewed all books and censored 
the illicit ones, and the Court of Star Chamber punished the unlicensed printers and 
authors, sometimes quite severely.  The Stationers’ Company had wide jurisdiction to 
“search what houses and shops (and at what time they shall think fit)” and to seize 
illegal publications and papers and to seek prosecution of their authors, printers, and 
distributors before the Star Chamber.300  
This traditional licensing law, though not revoked, ground to a halt during the first 
years of the Long Parliament, with the abolition of the Court of Star Chamber in 1641.  
This resulted in a massive torrent of new publications, Milton’s five anti-clerical tracts 
prominently among them.  But on June 14, 1643, the Long Parliament issued a new 
licensing order in an effort to stamp out the “many false, forged, scandalous, seditious, 
libelous, and unlicensed Papers, Pamphlets, and Books to the great defamation of 
Religion and government.” 301 The Order left it again to the Stationers’ Company to 
issue the licenses.  But now a dozen Protestant ministers, assigned by Parliament, 
replaced the Bishop of London as the censors of books on religious matters, and 
Parliament itself replaced the Star Chamber as the final enforcer of the licensing law.   
It was this new law that Parliament sought to enforce against Milton’s Doctrine 
and Discipline of Divorce, which he had published without a license. Though Milton was 
apparently never seriously threatened with arrest, he responded in 1644 with his 
Areopagatica: A Speech by Mr. John Milton for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, which 
would become a classic defense of free speech and press in the common law tradition.  
He wrote this tract, as he later put it, “that the determination of true and false, of what 
ought to be published and what suppressed, might not be in the hands of a few who 
may be charged with the inspection of books, men commonly without learning and of 
vulgar judgment, and by whose license and pleasure, no one is suffered to publish 
anything which may be above vulgar apprehension.”302 
Milton laid out the argument of the Areopagatica in brilliant rhetorical layers.  He 
started with an historical argument that book licensing and censorship were papal tools 
sharpened by the Inquisition that had no place in Protestant England.  Ancient Greece 
and Rome knew no such system of licensing and censorship, save in cases of outright 
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blasphemy or libel, and the early Church Fathers and Christian emperors held to this 
policy.  It was the medieval Catholic papacy that first introduced the censor and the 
index of prohibited books -- particularly after the invention of the printing press and the 
publications of early reformers like John Wycliffe and John Hus.  This system reached 
its height when the papacy called on the tyrannous Spanish Inquisition to enforce the 
decrees of the Council of Trent.  These hated inquisitors greatly expanded these 
“catalogues,” and “expurging indexes.”303  They “rake[d] through the entrails of many a 
good author” and invented new hells and purgatories for the many Protestants whom 
they tortured and killed for their writings.304   
Surely, no self-respecting English Protestant could think of adopting such a 
system, Milton intoned gravely, conveniently ignoring a century of English Protestants 
who did.  “I am certain that a state governed by the rules of justice and fortitude, or a 
church built and founded upon the rock of faith and true knowledge, cannot be so 
pusillanimous.”305  After all, it was the great leaders of church and state in the Long 
Parliament who first catalyzed all this “free writing and free speaking.”306  “You cannot 
make us now less capable, less knowing, less eagerly pursuing of the truth unless you 
make yourselves ... less the founders of our true liberty.”307  Surely, “freedom of writing” 
cannot now suddenly “be restrained by a discipline imitated from the prelates and 
learned by them from the inquisition.”308  Surely we did not all join the Reformation 
cause against Catholic censorship and superstition only to “make room for others” to 
enter “into their seats” and resume censorship “under another name.”309  Surely, this 
short “cruise of truth” has not already run its course, leaving “freedom of learning” 
destined to “groan again” under “old fetters.”310 
Milton’s next main argument was that licensing and censorship were impractical 
to implement and impossible to limit.  As the prior experiment of unlicensed printing had 
made all too clear, censors simply could not keep up with the pace of publication in 
England, nor stop the flow of illegal foreign books imported in sundry ships and 
saddlebags.  Even if they tried, most licensors had neither the wit nor the wisdom to 
judge many of the writings that came before them.  Nor could they be expected to 
sustain their interest or attention in the task, given the volume of work.  Even if the 
licensors could do their work, the printers could not.  They would be forever waiting on 
the bureaucrats to make up their minds and approve the texts.  They would never really 
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know whether they needed licenses to reprint old books.  Would the Bible, for instance, 
need a license, and could it honestly get one given its rather graphic language about 
sin, sex, and violence?  Would the Bible have to be abridged, leaving out, say, the Song 
of Songs with its preoccupation with female anatomy or the steamy passages on 
Samson and Delilah?  What if an author revises his work, or makes a change to the 
approved copy: were new licenses needed or did the old license need amendment?  
What if the orginal licenser was away or had moved on; was a whole new license 
needed?  How much should the printer charge, especially one forced to sit so long on 
his other literary wares?  The mechanics and economics were just impossible, Milton 
concluded.  And ultimately, why should this system be restricted to the printing of 
books?  Will not Parliament inevitably be moved to require licenses for pamphlets, 
music, art, and poetry, and eventually for unwritten speech, too -- sermons, speeches, 
songs, plays, board meetings, indeed plain talk altogether and everywhere?  There is 
no stop on this slippery slope of licensing and censorship once the perilous first step is 
taken.311  
But the real harm of licensing and censorship is done to the author and even 
more to the reading public.  It is bad enough that the author has to bear the “dishonor 
and derogation” of having to deal with petty and pecuniary bureaucrats who inevitably 
will delay and drive up the price of his publications.312  It is worse that every author, 
even a great doctor and professor, has to sit “under the correction of his patriarchal 
licenser.”313  This might well be a “punie” man, half his age and intelligence, who can 
still tell the author to “blot or alter what precisely accords not with the hidebound humor” 
that purports to be the censor’s “judgment” on behalf of the government and people.314  
Many of the best authors will leave England or fall silent, rather than sit “under the 
wardship of some overseeing fist” or watch their books “bear the scars” of their “fairest 
print” and most “cunning thoughts” cut out.315  Worst of all is that each of these 
bureaucrats, however incompetent, is made “a judge to sit upon the birth, or death of 
books.”  This is tragic, Milton wrote, with obvious self-reference.  For a book holds “the 
breath of a man’s reason,” the “efficacy and extraction” of his “living intellect.”316  It is 
filled with the “precious life-blood of a master spirit.”317  An author “summons up all his 
reason and deliberation to assist him; he searches, meditates,” and then pours his life, 
mind, and soul into his writing.318  Books, therefore, “are not absolutely dead things, but 
do contain a potency of life in them to be as active as that soul was whose progeny they 
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are.” 319 It is “as good almost kill a man as kill a good book; who kills a man kills a 
reasonable creature, God’s image; but he who destroys a good book kills reason itself, 
kills the image of God, as it were in the eye.”320 Censorship is a “kind of homicide,” 
“sometimes a martyrdom,” even “a kind of massacre.”321  
Milton used this startling term “massacre” to signal the grave threat that he 
thought censorship posed to the English Protestant nation as a whole.  The very nature 
of being a Protestant reformer, Milton argued, is to protest, to challenge, to reform, to 
fight falsehood with truth.  The Protestant Reformation was born in this dialectical 
struggle about the most fundamental truths of Scripture and nature. The Protestants’ 
strongest weapons in this struggle were their published books. Their best tactics were 
their open clashes of ideas with Catholics and with each other.  And their wisest 
conclusion was to call their followers to continue the struggle, to be constantly at work at 
further discovery and reform – semper reformanda, always reforming anew, as Calvin 
had put it.  “The light which we have gained” from the Reformation, Milton wrote, “was 
given us, not to be ever staring on, but by it to discover onward things more remote from 
our knowledge.  It is not the unfrocking of a priest, the unmitering of a bishop, and the 
removing him from off the Presbyterian shoulders that will make us a happy nation, no, 
if other things as great in the church, and in the rule of life both economical and political 
be not looked into and reformed, we have looked so long upon the blaze that Zwingli 
and Calvin hath beaconed up to us, that we are stark blind.”322  
The reformation must go on in the state and society as much as in the church 
and in the home, Milton insisted.  And it must go on with the same methods and insights 
that earlier Protestants had forged for the reformation of the church -- but now writ 
larger and more generic.  The Protestant premises of this new perpetual reformation are 
these: All have equal access and claim to the truth.  All have vocations and 
contributions that count.  All are prophets, priests, and kings with the freedom and duty 
to proclaim, to pastor, to participate fully in the commonwealth.  And all must write and 
speak, all must read and study the books of their fellows, just as they always read and 
study the Bible separately and together.  England is entering “a new and great period,” 
Milton wrote with mounting excitement, “even to the reforming of [the] Reformation 
itself.”323 
Behold now this vast  city; a city of refuge, the mansion house 
of liberty, encompassed and surrounded with his protection; 
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the shop of war hath not there more anvils and hammers 
waking, to fashion out the plates and instruments of armed 
Justice in defense of beleaguered Truth, then there must be 
pens and heads there, sitting by their studious lamps, musing, 
searching, revolving new notions and ideas wherewith to 
present, as with their homage and their fealty the approaching 
Reformation: others as fast reading, trying all things, 
assenting to the force of reason and convincement.  What 
could a man require from a nation so pliant and so prone to 
seek after knowledge.  What wants there to such a towardly 
and pregnant soil, but wise and faithful laborers, to make a 
knowing people, a nation of prophets, of sages, and of 
worthies.324 
 
This was Milton’s ideal – a nation where each and every person is unstintingly 
engaged in the great struggle and debate between Truth and Falsehood in order to 
bring greater and better reformation to state and society. This great struggle will 
perforce feature “much arguing, much writing, many opinions; for opinion in good men is 
but knowledge in the making.”325  But such factions and differences of opinion in the 
state and society should be celebrated, much as “schisms and sects” are celebrated in 
the church.326  Different private groups and opinions will sharpen and censor each 
other.  Each will reflect new light from above, new angles on truth.  So long as we all 
show “a little generous prudence, a little forbearance of one another, and some grain of 
charity,” we can all “unite into one general and brotherly search after Truth.”327  “[O]ut of 
the many moderate varieties and brotherly dissimilitudes that are not vastly 
disproportional arises the goodly and graceful symmetry that commends ... great 
reformation.”328   
 
Freedom of speech, of course, brings not only “goodly and graceful” speech but 
also at times evil and harmful speech.329  Bad speech that rises to the level of 
blasphemy of God, treason against the state, or defamation of another person, Milton 
insisted, must be subject to “the sharpest justice” against the “malefactors.”330  But none 
of this can and should be prejudged by a censor; let the reader make these judgments 
after the fact of publication.  So many books – from the classics to modern day printings 
– have bad and good speech inextricably intermixed within them.  Man is both sinner 
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and saint (simul iustus et peccator), and his writings will invariably reflect both qualities.  
To censor a book is to deny human nature.331 
To censor a book is also to deny the nature of human judgment.  God created all 
of us as rational creatures, with a reason and conscience to choose a virtuous life, and 
with a promise of eternal reward for those who make wise choices.  Every person, from 
Adam and Eve forward, has been given “the knowledge of good and evil” and is 
confronted with sin and temptation.332  God, “though he command us temperance, 
justice, continence, yet powers out before us even to a profuseness all desirable things, 
and gives us minds that can wander beyond all limit and satiety.  Why should we then 
affect a rigor contrary to the manner of God and of nature, by abridging or scanting 
those means, which books freely permitted are, both to the trial of virtue, and the 
exercise of truth.”333  Virtue can be better known and appreciated by seeing its opposite 
in vice.  And the choice of a virtuous life is more genuine and praiseworthy when it is 
real and not artificial.  “If every action which is good or evil in man at ripe years, were to 
be under pittance, and prescription, and compulsion, what were virtue but a name?”334  
“I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and unbreathed, that never 
sallies out and sees her adversary but slinks out of the race, where that immortal 
garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat.  Assuredly, we bring not innocence 
into this world, we bring impurity much rather: that which purifies is trial, and trial is by 
what is contrary.”335 
“Truth and understanding,” then, “are not such wares as to be monopolized and 
traded in by tickets and statutes, and standards” of licensers and censors.336  Truth 
comes through revelation not restriction, through persuasion not compulsion, through 
debate not declaration.  Truth comes forth from the individual and collective judgments 
of each and every private Englishman, who discerns and discriminates for him or herself 
after hearing and reading all opinions on all sides. “A wise man, like a good refiner, can 
gather gold out of the drossiest volume, and ... a fool will be a fool with the best, yea, or 
without a book.”337  But most Englishmen are not fools.  They are “a free and ingenuous 
sort of such as evidently were born to study, and love learning for itself, not for lucre, or 
any other end, but the service of God and of truth.”338  England is “a Nation not slow and 
dull, but of a quick, ingenious, and piercing spirit, acute to invent, subtle and sinewy to 
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discourse, not beneath the reach of any point the highest that human capacity can soar 
to.”339  
Give Englishmen some real education and real intellectual exercise, said Milton.  
Let “all the Lord’s people … become prophets” and preachers, readers and teachers.340  
Let the people take up “the study of highest and most important matters to be reformed” 
by “disputing, reasoning, reading, inventing, discoursing, even to a rarity, and 
admiration, things not before discoursed or written of.”341  Give them freedom “to know, 
to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties.”342  Do all this, 
said Milton, and “I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation rousing herself like a 
strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks: Me thinks I see her as an 
eagle muing her mighty youth, and kindling her undazzled eyes at the full midday beam; 
purging and unscaling her long abused sight at the foundation itself of heavenly 
radiance.”343 
Part of the point of all this flowing rhetoric about freedom of speech was to prove 
just how powerful and edifying real free speech could be.  Many of Milton’s fellow 
reformers in his day saw this point exactly, and echoed his views with power and 
eloquence.  William Walwyn, John Goodwin, John Lilburne, Richard Overton, Henry 
Robinson, Henry Parker, John Robinson, and others offered variations on these 
arguments for freedom of speech in the 1640s and 1650s, as did an important Leveller 
petition to Parliament in 1648.344  All these arguments, with Milton’s the most eloquent 
amongst them, were important precedents for the eventual protections of freedom of 
speech and press set out in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, and eventually and more 
fully in American colonial charters and early republican constitutions as well.345 
Other Civil Freedoms.  Stripped of its ornate rhetoric, Milton’s theory of freedom 
of speech was at heart his theory of freedom of religion writ large.  Freedom of the 
religious and Spirit-filled conscience now became freedom of the rational and inquiring 
mind.  The devout and faithful parishioner in the pew now became the good and solid 
citizen on the street.  The prophet, priest, and king in the church now became the 
advocate, worshipper, and ruler in the state.  The tolerated plurality of Scriptural 
interpretations and applications in private now became the open marketplace of true 
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and false ideas competing in the public square.  The second reformation of the church 
now became the second reformation of the commonwealth altogether.   
Milton predicated his expanded vision of liberty on the same firm belief that God’s 
truth would triumph once freed from human errors and controls.  Just as “all the winds of 
doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field,” Milton wrote; “we 
do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength.  Let her and 
Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter.  
Her confuting is the best and surest suppressing.  He who hears what praying there is 
for light and clearer knowledge to be sent down among us, would think of other matters 
to be constituted beyond the discipline of Geneva, framed and fabricated already to our 
hands.”346 Here again was Milton’s favorite theme: the Reformation must go on.  
Milton’s powerful vision of the place of the individual in society and the state 
could support many other civil liberties besides those of speech and press.  Milton did 
not reflect upon other civil liberties with nearly the care and passion he devoted to 
freedom of speech.  But here and there in his Areopagatica, and more often in his later 
writings, he ticked off other rights and liberties that followed naturally from his robust 
view of the individual.  Many of these civil rights, too, which were more forcefully 
articulated by other Puritan pamphleteers in the day, eventually found their way into the 
1689 English Bill of Rights and into the bills of rights of later American constitutions. 
The most important of these were the right of the people to democratic election of 
political officials, and the right to petition these officials once elected.  What better place 
for the people to debate truth and falsehood, said Milton, than in the choice of those 
who should govern them and protect them in all their rights and liberties. Included in this 
right to democratic government was the right of the people, through their 
representatives, to consent to the taxes they paid, and to consent to the wars fought 
and militaries marshaled on their behalf.  Also included was the right to Parliamentary 
oversight of judges and courts to ensure they not become tyrannical or bastions of 
privilege.  Included, finally, was the most fundamental right of the people – the right to 
dissent from, and if necessary to remove, politicians who no longer served or pleased 
them.  “[T]he right of choosing, yea of changing their own government is by the grant of 
God himself in the people.”347 
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Other civil rights naturally followed from this most important right, Milton argued.  
One was the right to contract and associate with other private persons – not only in 
marriages and churches, as we have seen, but also in clubs, businesses, guilds, 
charities, societies, and other associations organized for political, economic, 
recreational, or other licit purposes.  Another was the right of everyone to proper 
education and to accessible libraries and affordable books. Yet another important right 
was the right to jury trial in civil and criminal cases.  Here, in the adversarial procedures 
of the courtroom, the great contests of truth and falsehood were fought out in miniature, 
with the stakes sometimes very high for the life, liberty, and property of the defendant.  
This right to be judged by a jury of one’s peers, Milton later said, was part of a broader 
right to a fair trial by “due liberty and proportioned equality”348 in a duly constituted 
court.349 
Milton acknowledged that other Puritans of his day had “defended civil freedom 
more freely” than he had and had spelled out many more essential civil rights with 
greater legal specificity.350 He cited with approval the various proposals crafted by 
Lilburne, Walywn, Overton and other dissenters of his day to direct readers who wanted 
more detail.351  But Milton’s real focus was the theology and anthropology of freedom.  
And his real wish was to impress on his readers “the weightier matters of the law” of 
liberty.352  The most important lesson for him was this:  
that you should not be afraid to listen either to truth or 
falsehood, of whatever description that may be; but that you 
should listen the least of all to those, who never fancy that 
themselves are free, unless they deprive others of their 
freedom; who labor at nothing with so much zeal and 
earnestness, as to enchain not the bodies only, but the 
consciences of their brethren; and to introduce into church 
and state the worst of all tyrannies—the tyranny of their own 
misshapen customs and opinions.  May you ever take part 
with those, who think it just, that not their own sect or faction 
alone, but all the citizens alike should have an equal right to 
be free....  
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[Real] liberty be of that kind, which can neither be gotten, nor 
taken away by arms, and that alone is such, which, springing 
from piety, justice, temperance, in fine, real virtue, shall take 
deep root in your minds.... Unless by real and sincere devotion 
to God and man, not an idle and wordy, but an efficacious, an 
operative devotion, you drive from your minds superstition, 
which originates in an ignorance of true and substantial 
religion, you will not want [for] those who will sit upon your 
backs and upon necks, as if you were beasts of burden.... 
Unless you banish avarice, ambition, luxury, from your 
thoughts, and all excess even from families, the tyrant, whom 
you imagined was to be sought abroad, and in the field, you 
will find at home, you will find within.353 
V. Summary and Conclusions  
John Milton was a great Protestant reformer – a prolific scholar blessed with a 
longer life and a livelier pen than most of the other great reformers of early modern 
England.  Unlike many others, Milton fought with his pen, not with his sword, and he 
suffered the ignominy of being mostly ignored in his day rather than flogged, tortured, 
pilloried, or imprisoned like many of his compatriots.  Also unlike many others, Milton 
defied closely-guarded denominational labels – Puritan, Presbyterian, Leveller, 
Independent, Separatist, Brownist, Digger, Ranter, and other fine-grained variations on 
English Calvinism.  Milton was more interested in finding truth than fighting turf wars 
over the theological and political niceties, as he saw them, that balkanized so much of 
his English Calvinist world.  
This made Milton a controversial Calvinist in his own day, and he remains so in 
the eyes of many still today.  Milton the poet has always been welcome in most Calvinist 
circles.  With all those elegant verses on God and Satan, sin and grace, law and 
Gospel, heaven and hell: how could he not be welcome?  Even hellfire-and-brimstone 
Calvinists have always found enough in Paradise Lost and Paradise Regained to give 
him a place in their pews, albeit usually near the left exit door.  But Milton, the prose 
writer, who is the main subject of this Article: that is a different matter. Yes, the Luther-
like clatterings against Catholic superstition, the lovely panegyrics about the Bible, the 
passionate calls for a new Genevan-style reformation in England, and more have done 
much to commend Milton to many Calvinists.  But even Milton’s sympathetic readers, I 
among them, have always wondered about all that pugnacious and prolix prose – the 
hundreds of pages of brilliant and bare-fisted rhetoric raining down on all kinds of 
delicate subjects, the clever deconstructions and reversals of all kinds of settled texts 
and traditions, the huge piles of Bible verses and historical sources stacked so 
 
 




seductively to buttress all kinds of counterintuitive propositions -- including no-fault 
divorce no less.  For many Calvinist readers all this has always looked a bit too 
suspicious.  Such suspicions were underscored when Milton’s massive unpublished 
Christian Doctrine came to light for the first time in 1825.  For those who read this text 
closely, its many controversial passages put Milton not only on the far left bank of the 
Calvinist tradition, but sometimes squarely in the Arminian, Anabaptist, and even 
anarchist floodplains beyond.  It seemed safer to sail him by and stick with steadier and 
sturdier seventeenth-century Calvinists like the Divines of Westminster.354 
Whatever the merits of these general theological judgments about Milton’s work, 
they are not apt judgments about his contributions to the Calvinist reformation of law, 
religion, and human rights.  On this subject, Milton captured many of the best teachings 
of the Calvinist tradition better than many of his English peers, and he added several 
other teachings that would become critical to the development of modern rights 
doctrines on and in Calvinist terms.  Milton distilled and instilled many of the best legal 
and political teachings that earlier Calvinist reformers had already laid out.  These 
included teachings about human dignity and divine image-bearing, about natural law 
and the created order, about natural rights and Christian liberties, about subjective 
rights and social freedoms, about popular sovereignty and political covenants, about 
rule of law and constitutional order, about political tyranny and the right to resist.  On 
these themes and others, Milton was mostly a faithful and forceful summarizer of the 
best of the Calvinist tradition.  And he cited repeatedly and with genuine admiration the 
texts on point of the great reformers – Calvin and Bucer, Beza and Hotman, Ponet and 
Goodman, Knox and Buchanan. 
In devising his own reformation of rights, Milton seized on what he thought to be 
the reformers’ most important lesson – namely, that the Reformation must always go 
on.  England must not idolize or idealize any Protestant formulations, Milton insisted, 
even Calvin’s.  It must develop and deepen, apply and amend them in a continuous 
effort to reform church, state, and society anew.   There can be “no excuse of our delay 
[in] reforming,” Milton wrote already in 1642.355 Milton further seized on what he thought 
to be a cardinal teaching of Calvinism – namely, that God calls each and every mature 
person to be a prophet, priest, and king, with natural rights and duties to speak, 
worship, and rule in church and state, family and society at once.  For Milton, the driving 
forces of England’s perpetual reformation, therefore, were not only clerics or 
magistrates, scholars or aristocrats.  The reformers were just as much the commoners 
and householders, craftsmen and farmers of every peaceable type.   Every person was 
created by God with the freedom of conscience, reason, and will.  Every person was 
called by God to discharge both their private Christian vocations and their public social 
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responsibilities in expression of their love of God, neighbor, and self.  This was a form of 
Christian populism and popular sovereignty that the Calvinist tradition had not put quite 
so strongly before.  
Milton extended traditional Calvinist teachings in defining the religious, domestic, 
and civil rights and liberties that each person must enjoy in discharging these offices of 
prophet, priest, and king.  Among religious liberties, he defended liberty of conscience, 
freedom of religious exercise, worship, association, and publication, equality of multiple 
biblical faiths before the law, separation of church and state, and disestablishment of a 
national religion.  Among domestic liberties, he stressed urgently the right to marry and 
divorce in accordance with the explicit teachings of Scripture alone as he understood it.  
He also mentioned attendant rights to nurture, discipline, and educate one’s children 
and to have one’s private home free from unwanted searches and seizures of private 
papers and possessions.  Among civil liberties, he offered a brilliant defense of the 
freedoms of speech and press, and also defended earnestly the rights to democratic 
election, representation, petition, and dissent, as well as the rights to private association 
and to jury trial.  He also endorsed warmly many of the more detailed and expansive 
rights proposals of the Puritan pamphleteers.  
Few of these reforms came to lasting constitutional expression in Milton’s day, 
despite some innovative Parliamentary legislation in the later 1640s. Oliver Cromwell’s 
Protectorate government reversed many of these reforms after 1653, and the 
Restoration government rejected virtually all of them in 1660.  But the Puritan reform 
pamphlets of the mid-seventeenth century, so elegantly synthesized by Milton, provided 
a fertile seedbed for the growth of rights and liberties in the common law tradition.  In 
the generation after Milton, the Bill of Rights (1689) and Toleration Act (1689), born of 
the Glorious Revolution, guaranteed at least a measure of the rights of speech, press, 
religion, and jury trial that he and others had championed, and these guarantees were 
strengthened by later Parliamentary legislation.  In crafting these reform measures, 
leaders of the Glorious Revolution looked to Milton and to other Puritan revolutionaries 
for inspiration.   
Even when he was not directly cited or quoted, Milton’s ideas of liberty were 
pervasive, in the air.  This was true not just of his famous paean to free speech in the 
Areopagitica, which became a new Ur text in the common law canon of freedom and 
was endlessly cited.  Another striking example of Milton’s indirect influence can be seen 
in John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), a document which would have a 
monumental influence on American founders like Thomas Jefferson.356  Many of 
Locke’s arguments for religious liberty in this letter track closely those made by Milton 
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already in the 1640s and 1650s.357  Like Milton, Locke aimed to convince the English 
church and state of his day to sever their corrosive alliances and to cease their corrupt 
abridgments of the liberty of conscience. 358  “[A]bove all things,” Locke pleaded, it is 
“necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion, 
and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other.”359  The church, 
Locke wrote, must be “absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth.”360  For 
the church is simply “a voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of their 
own accord in order to the public worshipping of God, in such manner as they judge 
acceptable to Him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls.”361  Church members are 
free to enter and free to exit this society. They are free to determine its order and 
organization and arrange its discipline and worship in a manner they consider most 
conducive to eternal life. “Nothing ought, nor can be transacted in this society, relating 
to the possession of civil and worldly goods. No force is to be made use of upon any 
occasion whatsoever: for force belongs wholly to the civil magistrate.362 
State force, in turn, cannot touch religion, Locke argued. The state exists merely 
to protect persons in their outward lives, in their enjoyment of life, liberty, and property. 
“True and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind,” which only God 
can touch and tend.363 A person cannot be compelled to true belief of anything by 
outward force—whether through “confiscation of estate, imprisonments, [or] torments” 
or through mandatory compliance with “articles of faith or forms of worship” established 
by law. “For laws are of no force without penalties, and penalties in this case are 
absolutely impertinent, because they are not proper to convince the mind.”364 “It is only 
light and evidence that can work a change in men’s [religious] opinions: which light can 
in no manner proceed from corporal sufferings, or any other outward penalties” inflicted 
by the state.  Every person “has the supreme and absolute authority of judging for 
himself” in matters of faith.365  But not all are welcome to act on their judgments: 
Catholics, Muslims, and other believers “who deliver themselves up to the service and 
protection of another prince,” wrote Locke, have no place in this community.  Moreover, 
“those are not at all tolerated who deny the being of a God”—for “promises, covenants, 
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and oaths which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist.”366  
Every one of these justly famous statements of Locke could have been written by 
Milton. 
Not only later English reformers, but also American colonists and later American 
revolutionaries looked to Milton for inspiration and instruction in their construction of 
American rights and liberties.  In colonial New England, Milton’s ideas of religious and 
civil liberty helped to liberalize and pluralize the earlier Congregationalist 
establishments, and some of his writings became standard fare for students at Harvard, 
Yale, and Princeton in the eighteenth century.367  Both during the American Revolution 
of 1776, and during the construction of state and federal constitutions over the next 
twenty-five years, American founders as diverse as John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, 
James Madison, Thomas Paine, and James Otis cited Milton with reverence, and 
echoed his political writings -- most notably his caustic attack on “Constantinian” 
constructions of church and state and his defense of revolution against royal tyranny.368  
As John Adams put it in 1776, John Milton was “as honest a man as his nation ever 
bred, and as great a friend of liberty” that the common law tradition has seen.369 
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